Second Strike Capability

In this article, we shall discus the term “second-strike capability” in international relations. This term second-strike capability is very important, particularly when we are discussing nuclear war between state actors. We will not only examine the definition of second-strike capability, but we will also discuss the ways in which this term has been used in the field of international relations. Then, we will discuss whether second strike capabilities and nuclear weapons serve as deterrents to international conflict, or whether nuclear weapons makes the world no safer from nuclear war. Then, we shall also examine current discussions of second-strike capability as it pertains to Pakistan and India.

What is Second Strike Capability?

Second-strike capability is the idea that in the case of a nuclear attack by one state towards another state, that the second state (the state attacked) would be able to survive an initial strike, and have the ability to counter with a strike of its own attack on that initial attacking state. Others have explained it as the following: “The second strike provides a military the capability to hit back at an enemy in a situation where its land-based nuclear arsenal had been neutralized” (Dawn, 2015).

It is important to examine second-stirke capability, given the weight that the issue has been given in international relations and conflict studies. For example, “Many nuclear theorists hold that secure second strike forces revolutionize military and political affairs” and that “obtaining and preserving a secure second strike force has long been a primary goal for nuclear policymakers[,]” even though the ability to do so has actually been difficult (Long & Green, 2015). Furthermore, “Secure second strike forces hold pride of place in nuclear analysis in part because of the political effects they are said to produce: general stability, crisis stability, status-quo bias, and peace. These pacific con- sequences are based on the idea that competitions in risk-taking favor the defender of the status-quo. For instance, the purported stability of secure second strike forces relies in part on psychological findings that most people fear (in this case, ultimate) loss more than they value (probably less fundamental) gains. If only the balance of resolve matters in influencing outcomes, calculations about the political values at stake should give defenders a decisive bargaining advantage in a crisis” (Long & Brown, 2015: 65).

The history of the notion of second-strike capability stems from the politics of the Cold War. As Basrur (2014) says, “The foundational concept of assured second strike capability and its derivatives emerged from a series of seminal writings that emanated from the American strategic establishment in the 1950s and 1960s, notably from the RAND Corporation” (2). However, there were others such as thinker Patrick Blackett were more critical of the notion of a second-strike credibility [we shall discuss the criticisms of second-strike credibility below] (Basrur, 2014).

The term second-strike capability has ties to the term “deterrence” in international relations. As Waltz (1981) explains, to defend and to deter in terms of conflict are not one and the same. Speaking on this issue, Waltz (1981) argues: “Defence and deterrence are often confused. One frequently hears statements like this: ‘A strong defence in Europe will deter a Russian attack’. What is meant is that a strong defence will dissuade Russia from attacking. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. Purely deterrent forces provide no defence. The message of a deterrent strategy is this: ‘Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains’. Second-strike nuclear forces serve that kind of strategy”

The issue of second strike capability has been in the news as of late with regards to the situation as it pertains to India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers in the international system. For example, there were discussions in March 2015 about Pakistan’s desire to implement a sea-based second strike capability to a potential nuclear attack.

And in September of 2015, “Former defence secretary retired Lt Gen Naeem Khalid Lodhi has claimed that Pakistan possesses second strike capability against India…The former defence secretary said that despite the growing conventional imbalance, Pakistan had certain strengths including the nuclear parity with India and credible nuclear deterrence. The nuclear deterrence, he said, had been augmented by the second strike capability, efficient delivery systems and effective command and control system” (Dawn, 2015). Plus, according to President of SVI, Dr. Zafar Iqbal, has been supported by the “deployment of Hatf-VII/Baber nuclear capable cruise missile that is launchable from aircrafts and conventional submarines. It is further fortified by the deployment of Hatf-VIII/Ra’ad air launched cruise missile” (Dawn, 2015).

What are the effects of Second Strike Capability?

There are two primary theories as it pertains to second strike capability in international relations. The first theory, advocated greatly during the Cold War between the United States and the USSR was the idea that with two hostile states, each with nuclear weapons capabilities, that they would not risk attacking one another with nuclear weapons, for fear that the other side, with second strike capabilities, would not hesitate to respond, which in turn could lead to outright nuclear war between the two states.

In fact, it is this case of the Cold War that many, including realists, have pointed to as evidence that nuclear weapons can stabilize the international system, that states will not want to fight one another.

However, there have also been many who have offered criticisms to this idea that a second-strike capability will serve as an effective deterrent to nuclear weapons being used, or to a nuclear war taking place. Yes, while it is correct that there was no direct war, it is much more difficult to prove that the nuclear weapons, and that second strike capability had anything to do with it.

An outspoken individual on the issue of nuclear weapons, and the reliance on second-strike capability to deter conflict was Patrick Blackett. Within this writings, he was highly outspoken about the role of nuclear weapons, and continued to advocate for nuclear disarmament in the international system (Basrur, 2014). Blackett offered critiques of those that believed nuclear weapons would bring about safety and stability, saying that many of the arguments made by others were inaccurate. For example, some were suggesting that the idea of being able to destroy an entire society will be enough to stop leaders from engaging in nuclear conflict. However, he argued against this, saying that in the case of the USSR, having suffered millions of deaths during the World War II, they would not be any more likely to fear a nuclear attack that would devastate their society (critics of this might argue that leaders would still be hesitant to bring about any nuclear counterattack if it would destroy the entire society, including the leadership in power, for example).

Blackett continues by suggesting that second-strike capability as advocated is not how policymakers would directly act. Basrur (2014) speaks of Blackett’s position this issue, saying: “The overarching argument put forward by Blackett was that the choices before an aggressor state are stark: only if it is fully confident that there will be no retaliation can it take the risk of striking first – and no one can be that certain. Thus, deterrence rests ultimately not on the defender’s certainty of hitting back after absorbing a first strike, but on the aggressor’s uncertainty of being able to avoid retaliation. It follows that elaborate calculations about the distribution of forces are superfluous. Even if the two sides are numerically unequal in the size and capabilities of their nuclear arsenals, a “stronger” power cannot risk the possibility of retaliation by a “weaker” one because it cannot know in advance the level of retaliation that it may have to face. In short, most arguments about assured second strike capability are not in tune with the reality faced by policy makers” (3).

Furthermore, when one examines the Cold War, one of the closest times that the world has come to a nuclear war was between the US and USSR over the Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, the United States had nuclear weapons in Turkey. As a response, the USSR moved nuclear warheads into Cuba. After the United States discovered the missiles, there were very tense moments between the two states, some of which may have further moved the two countries to war. In fact, some that were involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis believed that there was a strong chance of a war happening. It was only through continued diplomacy that the US and USSR leaders were able to come to an agreement that included the US not attacked Cuba, the USSR moving their weapons from Cuba, and the US moving their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. While advocates of nuclear weapons as a deterrent will argue that this case illustrates the concern of a nuclear war, critics of nuclear weapons and the idea that second strike capability will make the world safer argue that despite nuclear weapons, it seems that the two powers were very close to still engaging in such conflict.

There are scholars who also argue that actually achieving second strike capability is much easier said than done. Long & Green (2015) examine the ease of which second strike capability can be established. Looking at historical examples during the Cold War, they argue that while many have argued that setting up second strike is not very difficult, instead much more credit should be given to US intelligence for being able to do so. Writing on this issue, they say:

References

Basrur, R. (2014). Deterrence, Second Strike and Credibility: Revisiting India’s Nuclear Strategy Debate. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Issue Brief #255, July 2014. Available Online: http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB255-RajeshBasrur-IndiaNuclear.pdf

Long, A. & Green, B.R. (2015). Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and National Security. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1-2, pages 38-73. Available Online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150

Waltz, K. (1981). The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, “Adelphi Papers, Number 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. Available Online: http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/10B_Waltz.pdf