UN International Court of Justice
In this article, we shall discuss the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ). We shall examine the history of the ICJ, its place in international relations and also in international human rights and the human rights of the UN, the makeup and mandate of the International Court of Justice, criticisms of the UN International Court of Justice, as well as offer recommendations on further reading on the subject. We will also list references as related to the ICJ.
History of the International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice is the “principled judicial organ of the United Nations” (ICJ, 1945), and is based at the Hague in the Netherlands. The International Court of Justice was founded during the early years of the United Nations, namely, in 1945. However, despite its creation during the early formation of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice was actually a byproduct from the earlier League of Nations, the IO that the United Nations essentially came out of. For example, when examining the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 14 calls for the creation of a judicial body known as the Permanent court of International Justice (PCIJ). Similar to the UN International Court of Justice, ” such a court [was] to be competent not only to hear and determine any dispute of an international character submitted to it by the parties to the dispute, but also to give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly” (ICJ, 2014). It was in 1922 that the Permanent Court of Justice was first hearing cases within the League of Nations (ICJ, 2014). The Permanent Court of International Justice was said to be a great institution for addressing international relations issues through non-coercive means. Even today, the International Court of Justice, writing on the Permanent Court of Justice, says about the PCIJ that
“The PCIJ was thus a working reality. The great advance it represented in the history of international legal proceedings can be appreciated by considering the following:
- unlike arbitral tribunals, the PCIJ was a permanently constituted body governed by its own Statute and Rules of Procedure, fixed beforehand and binding on parties having recourse to the Court;
- it had a permanent Registry which, inter alia, served as a channel of communication with governments and international bodies;
- its proceedings were largely public and provision was made for the publication in due course of the pleadings, of verbatim records of the sittings and of all documentary evidence submitted to it;
- the permanent tribunal thus established was now able to set about gradually developing a constant practice and maintaining a certain continuity in its decisions, thereby enabling it to make a greater contribution to the development of international law;
- in principle the PCIJ was accessible to all States for the judicial settlement of their international disputes and they were able to declare beforehand that for certain classes of legal disputes they recognized the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory in relation to other States accepting the same obligation. This system of optional acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court was the most that it was then possible to obtain;
- the PCIJ was empowered to give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the League of Nations Council or Assembly;
- the Court’s Statute specifically listed the sources of law it was to apply in deciding contentious cases and giving advisory opinions, without prejudice to the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties so agreed;
- it was more representative of the international community and of the major legal systems of the world than any other international tribunal had ever been before it.”
Now, this is not to say that no problems existed with the PCIJ. For example, one of the most problematic issues was that one’s membership in the League of Nations did not guarantee membership in the court (Murphy, 2012).
The function of the UN International Court of Justice as a judicial body is centered around Chapter 33 of the United Nations, which calls, among other points, the use of judicial means to settle international conflicts between UN states. And within states, states are called to use mediation and arbitration methods to help resolve disputes (ICJ, 2014). Interestingly, following the fall of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, the states that were in discussions with creating the United Nations in the 1940s were discussing whether an international court was needed (ICJ, 2014). It was in San Francisco where states were finalizing the United Nations that they also addressed the creation, organizational structure, and mandate of a new international judicial body, what came to be known as the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 2014). And the International Court of Justice kept much of the organizational structure as the PCIJ. And thus, “[t]he Charter therefore plainly stated that the Statute of the International Court of Justice was based upon that of the PCIJ” (ICJ, 2014). In addition, “as the first global judicial court, the PCIJ began the judicial process of clarifying and codifying core elements of substantive international law and thus generated a stream of “first impression” findings that continue to be cited and built upon today by the ICJ” (Murphy, 2012: 2).
And in October of 1945, the PCIJ met for the final time, and it was here that they transferred power to the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 2014). However, one difference between the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice is that the ICJ is actually a part of the United Nations. This was not the case with the Permanent Court, which, while tied to the League of Nations, was actually separate from the IO (Greenwood, 2011). Furthermore, if one is a member of the UN, then they are also a member in the International Court of Justice statute (Murphy, 2012).
The Mandate of the UN International Court of Justice
The UN International Court of Justice hears cases that are brought to the court by other states in the United Nations. In fact, some have argued that that is an important and highly positive feature of the International Court of Justice, namely that states have a body in which they can receive judicial process for any feelings of abuse that they believe they face. This issue of states bringing suits against other states is important, because while this is a central feature of the ICJ, with this rule also is the fact that for binding decisions, non-state actors are not included in the mandate of the UN International Court of Justice. And as we shall discuss in the ICJ criticisms section, that point has been a criticism of the court, that their mandate is to limited to only state complaints and only to accusations of state violations of international law (Greenwood, 2011).
It is here that non-state actors are able to still participate in the UN ICJ by providing information for the ICJ judges with regards to the advisory opinion case where, “[u]nder Article 66(2) of the Statute, the Court decides which States and international organizations are likely to be able to furnish information on the question asked and invites them to participate in the proceedings” (Greenwood, 2011: 242). However, other states, non-states, or non-UN states can also be asked to provide information if the ICJ judges believe that this information is pertinent to the issue being discussed (Greenwood, 2011).
Moreover, the UN International Court of Justice has a mandate to hear a multitude of topics within international law, which includes but is not limited to international security issues, or international human rights law. Thus, states are able to bring a range of cases to the court, cases that may be important to them, their region, or the entire world at large (Greenwood, 2011), although they often try to avoid cases that are viewed as political as opposed to legal issues (Hurd, 2014).
However, with the mandate of the International Court of Justice, in order for it to be applicable to the states in question with regards to the case, both states must support the authority of the ICJ. As Posner (2004) explains, “The ICJ has jurisdiction over three types of cases: (i) cases by “special agreement,” where the parties to a dispute agree to submit their case to the court; (ii) cases authorized by a treaty that provides the future disputes arising under the treaty will be adjudicated by the ICJ; and (iii) cases between states that have declared themselves subject to the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the court” (5).
Furthermore, when looking at states supporting the UN International Court of Justice, “…an overwhelming majority of these states [that recognize the ICJ]…place reservations on their optional clause declarations, which can limit the Court’s adjudication prerogatives. On the other hand, it is much more common for states to recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction through compromissory clauses in bilateral or multilateral treaties…” (Powell & McLaughlin, 2007: 397). Furthermore, those “legally binding [rulings] only [apply] on the parties to the case and only with respect to the case in question. They are not binding on other states or on the Court itself, and as a result ICJ cases do not create precedents” (Hurd, 2014: 194).
And because most states are not a party to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in a paper entitled “The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems”, Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell have examined what makes states more likely to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. They found that acceptance of the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction depends in part on a country’s legal system. Specifically, “…civil law countries are more likely to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice than common law or Islamic law countries. On the other hand, common and Islamic law states design more precise commitments to the court with more reservations and have more durable commitments” (412).
The UN International Court of Justice and Advisory Opinions
The UN International Court of Justice also has the mandate to provide advisory opinions. When a state (or a group of states, such as the United Nations General Assembly or the United Nations Security Council) asks the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, the ICJ first decides whether the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court. Then, if it is in the jurisdiction of the court, they then ask whether there is a reason for them to not hear the case. Regarding jurisdiction with regards to advisory opinions, “…the competence of the Court in this regard is based on Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute, according to which the Court “may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request”, and secondly that the General Assembly, which seeks the advisory opinion, is authorized to do so by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides: “The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question” (ICJ, 2004: 1).
How is the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) Organized?
The UN International Court of Justice is made up of judges from fifteen members states of the United Nations. These judges have nine year terms, but they may serve more if their term is renewed (Murphy, 2012). Furthermore, with regards to the selection of ICJ judges, all fifteen judges must be from different countries. And although these judges come from different countries within the United Nations, “The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character” (ICJ, 1945). Thus, these judges are not there to represent their home states, but rather, to uphold the letter of the law.
In addition, in terms of the nomination process of judges for the UN International Court of Justice, “At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the states which are parties to the present Statute, and to the members of the national groups appointed under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court (ICJ, 1945, Article 5). Furthermore, “[n]o group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality. In no case may the number of candidates nominated by a group be more than double the number of seats to be filled” (ICJ, 1945: Article 5, point 2). And once the judges are elected, they are on the ICJ for nine years, although the terms are renewable (Posner, 2004). It is important to point out that the reason that groups nominate the judges–and not states themselves–is due to avoiding any potential views of ties between a judge and a country (although a state gets to have a judge from its own country on the bench if they are a party to a case being heard in the International Court of Justice (Murphy, 2012).
The judges are selected by United Nations member states based on regional blocks (not unlike those of the ten non-permanent positions in the UNSC, with the permanent members usually having a judge from their country on the ICJ at all times) (Posner, 2004). First, different judges are nominated by the Permanent Court of Arbitrations. Then, they are selected by states in the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the United Nations Security Council. The votes are held separately, and whoever gets the majority in each the UNGA and the UNSC will be elected to the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1945). With regards to the vote, they are voted by “an absolute majority in both the General Assembly (97 votes) and Security Council (8 votes). The timing of elections is staggered so that the GA elects a third of the Court once every three years” (UNElections.org).
Along with the fifteen judges, there is also a position of the Presidency, as well as vice-presidency within the International Court of Justice. Here, “[t]he President and the Vice-President are elected by the Members of the Court every three years by secret ballot. The election is held on the date on which Members of the Court elected at a triennial election are to begin their terms of office or shortly thereafter. An absolute majority is required and there are no conditions with regard to nationality. The President and the Vice-President may be re-elected” (ICJ, 2014b). In terms of the functions of the President, s/he “presides at all meetings of the Court; he/she directs its work and supervises its administration, with the assistance of a Budgetary and Administrative Committee and of various other committees, all composed of Members of the Court. During judicial deliberations, the President has a casting vote in the event of votes being equally divided. In The Hague, where he/she is obliged to reside, the President of the Court takes precedence over the doyen of the diplomatic corps.” (ICJ, 2014b) (For a list of all International Court of Justice Presidents, see ICJ, 2014b).
How are cases heard at the UN International Court of Justice?
The UN International Court of Justice has a detailed process for which contentious cases can be heard by the court. To begin, a country filing the complaint will do so to the ICJ. In the motion, they will also discuss the complaint, how it fits within the International Court of Justice mandate, as well as what what they hope will happen with regards to the issue. If the issue is not immediately pressing, then it goes through the ICJ. Namely, the two sides will meet with the President of the International Court of Justice, and following this, “a schedule is set for the filing of a Memorial and Counter-Memorial, which may also be followed by a second round of written pleadings in the form of a Reply and Rejoinder” (Murphy, 2012: 19). Then there is an oral hearing within the ICJ. Here, both the accuser and the respondent state their points, with the International Court of Justice judges hearing both sides of the issue. Following the hearing of the different points made by the states, the ICJ puts together a set of judges to rule on the case (the number of which can vary) (Murphy, 2012). Once the judges rule on the “contentious issues”, there is no appealing the ruling (Murphy, 2012). However, if no information comes to light, the International Court of Justice can revisit the previous decision (Murphy, 2012).
Contributions of the UN International Court of Justice
The United Nations International Court of Justice has been said to serve an important function in international relations with regards to issues of human rights, international security, territorial disputes, as well as international law. It is necessary to understand the place of the International Court of Justice amongst other international judicial bodies. While there are many different sorts of international courts and tribunals in the international system, some have argued that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has certain characteristics that make the court quite unique. For example, on this issue with regards to the International Court of Justice, Judge Christopher Greenwood (2011), who, when writing on this issue in 2011, was on the International Court of Justice, says that
“It has a universality which other courts and tribunals do not possess. Any of the 192 member States of the United Nations can be parties to cases before it and all can participate in the vote in the General assembly to elect the judges of the Court.30 Today, that universality is more pronounced than ever. States have been parties in cases before the Court (twenty-five are parties to pending cases). Moreover, they come from all regions of the world: of the parties to pending cases, six are from Africa, six from Latin America and the Caribbean, three from Asia, five from Eastern Europe, and five from the West European and Others Group. Forty-three States took part in the recent proceedings on the request for an advisory opinion regarding the declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. All 192 member States of the United Nations took part in the last vote to elect five judges in 2008” (241).
(Here is a list of all International Court of Justice cases and rulings).
Criticisms of the UN International Court of Justice
There have been a number of criticisms of the United Nations International Court of Justice. We have compiled a list of criticisms of the ICJ found in the academic and policy literature.
Limited Conditions for the UN International Court of Justice to Hear Cases: State Recognition of Jurisdiction
One of the most frequently cited criticism of the UN International Court of Justice by scholars, policymakers and practitioners has been what is viewed as the limited mandate of the ICJ, namely, that it is solely a court to hear cases between states, and thus, this is why the ICJ is so different from other human rights judicial bodies, many of which have avenues for non-state actors to file complaints (Crook, 2004: 2). And this often limits the ability to hear cases on international security or human rights. If a country does not want to have the ICJ hear a case regarding an issue that they are a party to, all they have to do is say that they will not allow the ICJ to have jurisdiction (Posner, 2004: 7). Thus, “[s]tates cannot be sued before the ICJ without their consent” (Murphy, 2012: 15), even though they are a party to the ICJ. In fact, as Murphy (2012), “[t]his requirement of further state consent is why most of the…U.N. Member States have never appeared before the Court in a contentious case and why the Court is regarded as an important, but not dominant, player in the field of international dispute resolution” (15).
However, many states have not agreed to the powers of the United Nations International Court of Justice. For example, “[o]nly about a third of U.N. members accept compulsory jurisdiction based on Article 36(2) of the statute” (Crook, 2004: 6). Furthermore, even within these third of the UN states that have granted jurisdiction to the ICJ, a number of them “have significantly conditioned their acceptances” (Crook, 2004: 3). Other countries have retracted their commitment to the powers of the ICJ. For example, the United States, while having historically been supportive of the powers of the International Court of Justice, “withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in 1984” (6).
The ability for the International Court of Justice to hear a case that both states agree to is referred to as “Special Agreement Cases” (Posner, 2004: 7). In addition to Special Agreement Cases, the International Court of Justice can also preside over/have jurisdiction with regards to “treaty-based” cases. In this case, states would have to give their permission to in order for themselves to be able to act with regards to the treaty (for example, if they want to bring a case against another state to the International Court of Justice, they themselves would need to have given the ICJ treaty based jurisdiction) (Posner, 2004: 7). Thus, unless both state are willing to submit to the powers and ruling of the ICJ, the International Court of Justice is unable to hear cases between states, which has strongly limited the ability to hear human rights cases (Crook, 2004), particularly since so many human rights violations are committed by state governments themselves.
Lastly, the UN International Court of Justice can also have what is known as “compulsory jurisdiction”. Compulsory jurisdiction is when states file a declaration regarding the International Court of Justice. However, the criticism has been that most states that have given this declaration of support have done so for only a small subset of possible case issues, thus limiting the overall span of what the ICJ can hear with regards to many states (Posner, 2004). States will often find ways to minimize their risk in such cases. For example, as Posner (2004) points out, the United States has provided the International Court of Justice with “compulsory jurisdiction” through a declaration, however, this declaration does not include cases on issues of national security (7). And as one can imagine, the United States could attempt to make an argument that almost all matters could in some way or another be argued as a “national security” matter, thus limiting the arm of the ICJ against their activities.
Moreover, there are times where the International Court of Justice itself will not hear a case. For example, “[e]ven i f the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a claim, the Court might regard a claim as inadmissible, (although the exact distinction between the two concepts is not always clear). Thus, in certain cases, the Court has relied upon a rule of customary international law known as the “local remedies rule.” Before a State may espouse a claim on behalf of its national, it must show that the national has exhausted all available legal remedies in the courts and administrative agencies of the State against which the claim is brought…” (Murphy, 2012: 17-18).
The UN International Court of Justice and Human Rights
Related to this earlier point, scholars have also argued that human rights have not been given great attention as an overall amount of cases compared to non-human rights cases. For example, Crook (2004), writing in 2004, explains that “There have been a few ICJ (and PCIJ) decisions significantly contributing to human rights law, but historically they have been a small part of the docket. To give an unscientific illustration, if you look at the indexes of the five recent volumes of the I.C.J. Reports covering 1994-1997 sitting in my bookcase, you’ll see very few references to “human rights.” Those you do see are concentrated in dissenting or separate opinions of a few judges. Thus, human rights issues have been an intermittent and not especially important part of the Court’s work” (3).
Cases Showing Ineffectiveness/Lack of Compliance of the UN International Court of Justice
There have been a number of cases which could be interpreted as illustrating possible examples of International Court of Justice ineffectiveness due to inability to force states to comply with their rulings or opinions. Just a few of these cases include: the “United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1979-1981)…[where] [t]he U.S. filed an application against Iran after the Iranian government permitted militants to seize the American embassy and take members of the embassy staff hostage. the ICJ ruled in favor of the U.S. but the ruling did not appear to have any influence on Iran, which refused to participate in the proceedings” (Posner, 2004: 9). Other cases include the United States and their actions in Nicaragua and Paraguay during the 1980s. In the case of Nicaragua, a case against the United States was brought to the ICJ because Nicaragua accused the U.S. of was carrying out secret actions while helping the rebels against the Sandinista government. And while the ICJ ruled against the US, the American government not only ignored the ruling, but the U.S. also “withdrew its consent to compulsory jurisdiction” (Posner, 2004: 9). Then, in Paraguay, there was a case entitled Brerard, which took place in 1988. Here, the United States arrested a national of the country of Paraguay. The United States had plans to execute the individual. There were two cases against America in the International Court of Justice. And despite the fact that the United States was ruled against in the International Court of Justice, as well as in two later cases, they decide to ignore all of the ICJ’s rulings (Posner, 2004).
The point with these cases (and there are many more similar ones) is that the UN International Court of Justice has very little enforcement mechanisms when it comes to their rulings. In fact, there are little enforcement mechanisms that the International Court of Justice has other than levying fines against a country in cases where there was monetary damage. States were not interested in having the ICJ have its powers extended to their domestic courts, and whether these rulings could be used against the state domestically. As Sean Murphy (2012) points out, “the recourse envisaged by the U.N. Charter is for the victorious party to appeal non-compliance to the U . N . Security Council, “which may, i f it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment”” (20).
Thus, there has been debate as to the level of effectiveness of the International Court of Justice. And while some have questioned its effectiveness for the reasons mentioned, others such as Aloysius P. Llamzon, in a 2008 paper entitled “Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice,” which was published in The European Journal of International Law, argues that following the 1984 case in Nicaragua, states have been better at following ICJ decisions, even if some of the acceptances were not immediate (852). And thus, Llamzon (2008) has argued for that the International Court of Justice is still an important judiciary body in international relations.
Issues of Bias within the UN International Court of Justice
Along with criticisms of a limited mandate, and very few cases related to human rights issues, there have also been concerns that the UN International Court of Justice judges have shown bias in their court rulings. Scholars have attempted to test such claims. For example, such as Eric Posner (2004) published a paper entitled Is the International Court of Justice Biased? In his work, Posner examines whether judges are more likely to vote in favor of the country of nationality than voting impartially, when their state is one of the states in the case. Looking at voting behavior of judges with regards to their home states, Posner (2004) found that in 90 percent of those cases, the judges did not rule against their home country (28). In addition, if their state is not one of the parties involved, there still seems to be a bias. Namely, the judges will vote in favor of the country most similar to their home state with regards to issues such as culture and type of political government (28). Posner (2004) does point out however that these judges may not be doing this on purpose, and there may be other caveats, such as unbiased voting with two similar states to their own home state, as well as some cases of where judges have voted against their home country (Posner, 2004: 29) (Interestingly, in the early years of the United Nations, there were calls to not allow judges to be on the case when their own country was one of the states) (Posner, 2004).
Others, such as Hernandez, in the piece “Impartiality and Bias at the International Court of Justice, have examined the idea of impartiality itself. Hernandez argues that one not focus on ideas of impartiality and then from there argue points of bias within the United Nations International Court of Justice, but
“…instead that the notion of impartiality should be understood against a background of partiality”, as an understanding by judges that they do carry with them prior experiences and predispositions that they must rationalise when making decisions based on law. Far from a praetorian guard of states’ interests, the Court’s judges define themselves through their fidelity to the rules of international law itself. The Court’s judges perceive the essence of their role to remain faithful—or partial—to the rules, standards and values that constitute the legal system. As such, the concept of judicial impartiality would better be conceptualised by “visualising”the judges within the context of the rules that they apply, rather than to be impartial in respect of the rules that they apply. Rather than to extinguish them fully, judges should strive to remain aware of pre-judgements and values, and retain a “reflective critical attitude” to the standards (or rules) they follow, apply and interpret. For in the final analysis, what is asked of judges is good judgement, and not simply a resolution of the dispute: the judicial role requires constant, discerning assessment of what the law, and its underpinning purposes, require in a particular case” (207).
Crook, J.R. (2004). The International Court of Justice and Human Rights. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights.
Hernandez, G.I. (2012). Impartiality and Bias at the International Court of Justice. Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 1, No. 3, pages 183-207.
Hurd, I. (2014). International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice, Second Edition. Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1945). Statute of the International Court of Justice. Available Online: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf
International Court of Justice (2004). Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Request for Advisory Opinion), Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004. Available Online: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2014a). History. Available Online: http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2014b). Presidency. Available Online: http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=3
Koroma, A.G. (2013). International Court of Justice, Rules and Practice Directions, pages 1-7. Available Online: http://www.stetson.edu/law/studyabroad/netherlands/media/WEEK1.Merkel-rulesproceicj.pdf
Greenwood, C. (2011). The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Global Community, pages 233-252. Available Online: http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/volume-17-2/Greenwood.pdf
Llamzon, A.P. (2008). Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 5, pages 815-852.
Murphy, S. D. (2012). The International Court of Justice, George Washington University Law School Public Law and Political Theory Paper No. 589, pages 11-35.
Posner, E.A. (2004). Is the International Court of Justice Biased? Chicago: John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 234, (2D Series), pages 1-43. Available Online: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/234.eap_.icj-bias.pdf
Powell, E. J. & McLaughlin Mitchel, S. (2007). The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 2, pages 397-415.