Kaliningrad Oblast

In this article, we will discuss the Russian-controlled territory of Kaliningrad Oblast in Europe. Kaliningrad is 15,1000 square kilometers, and has about 1 million people living in the region. While it is a part of Russia, and has been for decades, Kaliningrad Oblast is not directly connected to Russia, but rather, the region is over 300 kilometers away (Moses, 2004). Yet, this territory has been of strategic importance to Russia for quite some time (since the Cold War) (Sergunin, ND), and, as shall be pointed out here, is now arguably even more valuable to the country today, particularly with regards to pressure European states. We will discuss the history of Kaliningrad Russia, the relationship with mainland Russia, and also more recent events related to nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. It is necessary to understand this territory for the international relations of Russia, especially given rising hostilities between Russia and the United States, and also Russia and Europe.

History of Kaliningrad Oblast

In order to understand the politics of Kaliningrad, it is important to recognize the history of Kaliningrad Oblast. The entire region of Kaliningrad Oblast is an area in Europe (next to Poland and Lithuania). The region used be within East Prussia. In fact, the entire Kaliningrad Oblast belonged to German for 700 years, and was by the name of Königsberg. Then, “Königsberg was separated from Weimar Germany after the establishment of the “Polish Corridor” in the 1920s and 1930s.55 The Polish Corridor was a strip of land that encompassed the port city of Danzig, which the League of Nations declared a “free city.” The declaration meant that Poland would have special transshipment privileges in the area through direct access to the Baltic Sea” (Hollins, 2014: 25-26). Both Germany and Poland were upset by this, both concerned about sovereignty issues (Hollins, 2014).

During World War II, when the Soviet Union took over the territory, a number of Germans in Kaliningrad left, and many of them were also moved by the Soviets (Vitunic, ND). As Collins (2001) notes:

Josef Stalin invaded Poland in September 1939. Seeking to gain Lithuanian loyalty and consolidate his hold on the tiny state, Stalin returned the Polish owned Vilnius region to Lithuania in exchange for ìbasing privilegesî for the Red Army. In July 1940, after Stalinís communists executed a ìsynthetic revolution,î5 Lithuania applied for acceptance in the USSR as the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Immediately Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells published the U.S. position by denouncing, ìÖ the devious processes where under the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republicsÖ were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors.î6 These events are significant for understanding Kaliningrad. First, Vilnius became a de facto region within both the Lithuanian SSR and later independent Lithuania. Second, the Vilnius region, coupled with the Versailles borders, forms the border between Lithuania and what eventually became Kaliningrad. Finally, these events call into question the actions of western leaders concerning negotiations toward the warís conclusion.

Stalin was pressing Western leaders (the United States and Great Britain) to decide on the territories of Europe as early as 1943 during the Tehran conference (Collins, 2001). However, the US and Britain did not say what they would do about Konigsberg during this time. Interstingly, “When Stalin first requested Soviet control over Königsberg at Tehran, he advocated the Soviet need for a warm water port at the expense of Germany. This was the very excuse President Truman used to justify his Königsberg decisions at Potsdam ìÖby explaining to the American people that it was right to satisfy the age old Russian yearning for an ice-free port.î9 American diplomat George Kennan was incensed. He observed that Russia already had a number of substantially ice-free ports: Ventspils, Liepaya, and Baltiisky. Königsberg was 49 kilometers from the open sea at the end of an artificial canal that freezes several months of the year and requires icebreakers to keep it open” (Collins, 2001: 7).

It was in 1945, during the Posdam Conference, this territory was handed over to Stalin and Russia. However, during the Yalta conference in 1945, the US seemed to be accepting of Kaliningrad going to the Soviet Union (Collins, 2001). Collins (2001) argues that the West had to given Stalin Kaliningrad was in order to get his support for the Pacific Campaign (in the fight against the Axis powers). So during Potsdam, the West saw the Soviet influence in the Baltic countries and also in Poland, and wanting a unified Poland, the west gave Kaliningrad to Stalin (Collins, 2001). Plus, it seems that the West did not prioritize the Baltic area when looking at the Soviet Union as a whole (Collins, 2001).

The Soviet Union took control of the territory, and in 1946, and then began a “Sovietization” of Kaliningrad Oblast (Collins, 2001). So, they changed the names of buildings and places, got rid of German buildings, and then started building their own infrastructure. During the Cold War, “[t]he city of Kaliningrad became subsequently a closed military installation; military affairs and security dominated the region’s identity, the most westward of Soviet territory” (Vitunic, ND).

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union put in a lot of resources not only to Kaliningrad, but to the greater Baltic region. Kaliningrad witnessed rises in manufacturing, shipbuilding, and also fishing. The economic growth following the Second World War until 1970 “averaged over 200 percent per year for industry and about 100 percent per year in agriculture” (Collins, 2001: 10). Again, while there was of course attention the region, Kaliningrad was served primarily a military role for the Soviet Union. Thus, because of this, Kaliningrad was cut off from the West (Palmowski, 2010).

After the Cold War, there were conversations about what would happen to Kaliningrad Oblast. Would it continue to remain within Russia? Would it be an autonomous area? Would it call for independence? Would another neighboring country try to lay claim to Kaliningrad Oblast? Despite these questions, it became clear quickly that Kaliningrad was a very salient issue for Russia; if any country thought of annexing the country, they did not do so, since they understood the response that Russia would carry out if this happened. Plus, there were not disputes over the border that might suggest a renegotiation of claims for the territory. Plus, in terms of the population, the vast majority did not identify as German, Polish, or Lithuanian, but rather, following the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of the country (at 94 percent) saw themselves as either Russian, as Belorussian, or as Ukrainians (Collins, 2001: 11) (the more recent numbers show that the majority of citizens in Kaliningrad see themselves as Russian (78 percent), 8 percent of the population views itself as Belarusian, with 7 percent seeing themselves as Ukrainian, 2 percent view themselves as Lithuanian, only .6 percent identify as German, a half of a percent as Polish, and .3 percent identify as other groups (Hollins, 2014: 26) (although Moses (2004) points out that the youth may be becoming more detached from Russia, since a number of them have never been to the mainland, and much of their travels have been to neighboring Baltic countries). Hollins (2014) speaks about other reasons as to why no one (other than Russia) was pushing for Kaliningrad Oblast when he says:

After the Cold War, there were no Allied forces dividing territories; the Baltic States handled it themselves. Poland, Lithuania, and Germany all had strong historical claims to Kaliningrad, but none acted on it. There was no border dispute involving Poland or Lithuania; both were satisfied with the borders they had carved out for themselves after WWII. For Germany, still actively working on the reunification of East and West Germany, laying claim to Kaliningrad was untenable; they had neither the time nor the resources to focus on the territory. The population at the time was also something that the other Baltic States were not interested in absorbing. The forced migration of Soviet laborers and the huge population of military personnel made the region more “Russian” than anything else, and so no other Baltic state showed any real interest in adding 900,000 ethnic Russians to their fold. Russia had no intention of surrendering the Baltic Fleet headquarters. This fact turned out to be irrelevant at the time, as no other nation was contesting Russia’s control of Kaliningrad (26).

Today, Kaliningrad Oblast is of the utmost importance for the country, particularly with regards to having influence and access to Europe. Historically, “[s]ince Peter the Great, St. Petersburg has been Russia’s window towards Europe. Similarly, one may conclude that Kaliningrad has become Europe’s window toward Russia. Open windows are needed for creating a true partnership between Russia and the EU” (Liuhto, 2005). And while there continues to be some support for either an independent Kaliningrad or some notion of a Baltic republic (with a majority of those younger members of Kaliningrad’s society desiring independence) (Moses, 2004), for reasons noted below, Russia seems set on maintaining control of the region.

The Government of Kaliningrad Oblast

In terms of governance, while Kaliningrad Oblast itself continues to be a part of Russia, it does have a gubernatorial administration overseeing some of the issues pertinent to the region. For example, this more local government deals with creating a budget, it provides licenses for the use of natural resources, among other issues (Cichocki, B., Pelczynska-Nalecz, B. & Will, 2001). However, again, because this is not viewed as an independent or even autonomous region of Russia, the political authority still rests with Moscow. So, any of the main decisions such as how Kaliningrad will deal with political and military international relations, how they will structure trade and border questions with neighbors is all set by authorities in the Russian capital. Again, what has made matters difficult for Kaliningrad historically has been the lack of attention offered by Moscow (Cichocki, B., Pelczynska-Nalecz, B. & Will, 2001).

Russian Military Politics of Kaliningrad Oblast

For Russia, Kaliningrad is a very valuable political piece of territory that can help the Russian state carry out a number of its functions. While Kaliningrad Oblast is not particularly valuable economically for Russia, it does help serve a number of political interests. Because of this, there are hardliners in Russia who think the current level of control over the area does not go far enough, and that what is necessary is a more stringent hold on the area to ensure that the region does not improve its ties with the European Union and other Western states (Sergunin, ND).

Russia values Kaliningrad as the the region gives Putin a strong military presence in Europe. Russia began moving more troops and weapons into Kaliningrad during the Cold War. Over time, and after tend of the Cold War, the Baltic states expressed their concern at what they saw as a militarized Russia in their backyard. Now, it is interesting to note that the military numbers Russia had in Kaliningrad fell after the Cold War. Part of this was due to the end of the conflict itself, but budget concerns also limited their abilities to maintain active (paid and happy) troops in Kaliningrad (Collins, 2001). Another factor had to do with the need for more troops in Chechnya (Horris, 2014). Furthermore, because of the financial problems Russia experienced, they were unable to maintain the same military levels in Kaliningrad (and elsewhere). However, as we shall discuss, Russia has taken renewed interest in Kaliningrad Oblast for military reasons. Interestingly, Russia has rather consistently maintained large artillery and tanks in Kaliningrad. Part of the reason for this is that they are doing so to show force against neighboring NATO countries (Horris, 2014).

For example, Russia’s military expenditures grew in the 2000s, as did their military exercises. There were also announcements that soldiers in Kaliningrad would receive new supplies from Russia (although there were calls to reduce troop levels). In recent years, as the situation has gotten worse between the US and Russia, the Russian government has been more willing to utilize Kaliningrad. For example, “

Along with the general military interest in the area, Kaliningrad also offered a position on the Baltic Sea, which was important for the continued presence of a Russian navy on the Baltic sea. In fact, as Collins (2001) argues, “[a]s a military base, Kaliningrad eliminated the need for the Soviets to develop another naval facility of this size and scope in the southeastern Baltic. Even if Moscow had been inclined to move the fleet, there was nowhere to go” (12). So, it has not come as a surprise when Putin has spoken about the importance of establishing a Navy in Kaliningrad. For example, as Sergunin (ND) writes: “During his July 2000 visit to Kaliningrad President Putin stated that Russia must increase the size of its Navy if it is to remain a major world power. ‘The navy is an important element in national defence and we give particular attention to the development of the military fleet’, said Putin, speaking from the decks of an anti-torpedo boat in the Baltic Sea port of Baltiisk, where he was overseeing the navy’s annual parade. ‘Russia cannot carry on without a navy if it wants to play a role in the new world order’, Putin asserted.

Kaliningrad and Ukraine

In 2014, following the political developments in the Ukraine, Russia began supporting rebels in the Crimea, and recognized the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Then, Russia has continued to provide support to rebels in Eastern Ukraine looking to separate from the country. Russia has used Kaliningrad Oblast as a strategic location for putting pressure on Ukraine, as well as sending a message to European countries.

Kaliningrad and NATO

NATO and Russia have been at odds since the Cold War; if we recall, NATO was formed to check what the West viewed as Soviet communist aggression in the world. However, even after the end of the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, NATO has continued to exist, expanding its activities and places of action. Kaliningrad seemed to be viewed as the center of Russia’s anti-NATO view following the Cold War.

The mere existence of NATO after the Cold War has greatly upset Putin, who views the international organization as no longer relevant to international relations since the Soviet Union no long exists. As Lopata (2004) notes, “[i]t was not only reminded that for unification of Germany the West had promised Michail Gorbatchev that it would not extend the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or that such a development posed a threat to maintaining a frail democracy in Russia, but also attempts were made to issue threats of a new iron wall in which Kaliningrad embrasure would be wide open” (209). Following the expectations that Poland would indeed join NATO, in 1993, Russian leaders tried  tried to call for a military corridor of sorts from Lithuania to Kaliningrad, but they also viewed the Oblast region as one of military importance (Lopata, 2004) (Interestingly, due to a 1993 deal with Lithuania, “all military transports on land had to go by rail, and Russia had to ask permission, submit to inspections, and pay high fees each time. Russia also had to ask permission for military flights over Lithuanian air space on a flight-by- flight basis, and all bombers and fighter aircraft were prohibited” (Horris, 2014). The only types of weapons exempt were large artillery (Horris, 2014).

Again, what has made Russia even more upset is that not only is NATO as a military alliance still very real, but they have in recent years expanded their membership eastward. In 2004, they brought in former Soviet states such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 2008, they even led some to believe that Ukraine and Georgia were also on the path to NATO membership (for a conversation on this, see our article on Ukraine and NATO). So, for Russia, NATO is viewed as an aggressive entity that is trying to push forward towards Russian areas of influence. Therefore, Kaliningrad offers a very important space for Russia to maintain a foothold in Europe, and thus, offer a challenge to NATO, particularly as nuclear weapons are maintained in NATO countries such as Turkey. Interestingly, (according to a 2000 public opinion poll), the majority of the population in Kaliningrad has also shown disproval of NATO (Horris, 2014).

However, it is also argued that Kaliningrad Oblast also poses some challenges to Russia. While they have used the territory for a military activity for decades, Kaliningrad also has strong ties with the European Union economically. In fact, it “is a natural partner for the EU to cooperate with in areas such as economics, trade, transit of people and goods, transportation, environmental protection, research and education, etc. Numerous collaborative projects have already been implemented over the last decade. The institutional framework for such cooperation has been established and much positive experience has been obtained. Kaliningrad enjoys the reputation of the ëpilot regioní in EU-Russia relations” (Sergunin, ND: 87). Now, to say that Kaliningrad has easy access to European Union markets, and flawless relations with NATO countries would also be a mistake. For example, border crossings have continued to show difficult (and it is for that reason that some have called for additional crossing points in and out of Kaliningrad (Sergunin, ND).

Kaliningrad and Nuclear Weapons

Because of the increased tensions between NATO and Russia (and NATO countries such as the United States and Russia), whether in Syria, Ukraine, or elsewhere, Russia is using Kaliningrad as a location for their nuclear weapons.

However, this was not the first time that Russia thought about stationing nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. For example, in 1994, there were calls by some military generals for Russia to move away from its position of an unwillingness to use nuclear weapons. Not only this, but there were even calls for such a weapon to be moved to Oblast (Lopata, 2004). For some in Russia, any military weaknesses that existed needed to be straightened out, and moving nuclear capabilities to Kaliningrad was one way to do it, as this would not only help with the military problem, but some also saw this as helping Kaliningrad economically (Lopata, 2004).

And, as Vitunic writes, “”In January 2001 Western news reports announced that Russia planned to transfer nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad—a move denied by the Kremlin and never verified as fact. 16 This apparent Russian missile deployment to counter NATO enlargement caused apprehension throughout the West. With tensions rising surrounding the supposed deployment, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described Russia as “an active proliferator,” selling dangerous technology to governments hostile to the United States, prompting his Russian counterpart Igor Sergeyev to denounce the accusations as “rubbish.”17 The Russian defense ministry’s head of international relations General Leonid Ivashov announced that “the rhetoric of the new [US] administration is acquiring anti-Russian overtones and smacks of Cold War rhetoric”” (4).

However, in October 2016, Kaliningrad Oblast was in the news again regarding the issue of nuclear weapons after reports that Russia moved missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the region. According to a report on October 7th, 2016, Estonian officials noted that “Russia appears to be moving powerful, nuclear capable missiles into Kaliningrad, a Russian outpost province sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania along the Baltic coast. The Iskander-M missiles, which have a range of over 500km, are reportedly being transported by ship from the St Petersburg area. It had previously been reported that the Russians might seek to place the Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad but not until 2018-19″ (Wintour, 2016). The particular concern with this weapon is of course that it has the ability to have a nuclear weapon on it. But along with this, the missile can also go 500 kilometers, and can move direction in mid-flight (Wintour, 2016). More specifically, “[a]ccording to Nato strategists, Russia is layering surface-to-air missiles in Kaliningrad in an effort to block off Nato’s air access to the three Baltic states and areas of Poland” (Forster, 2016).

All of this is troubling to NATO, and especially the NATO countries Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg was quoted as saying, “The main challenge is not individual events or deployments…It is the overall picture, where we see a substantial increase in Russia’s capabilities at sea, in the air and on land; exercises with a more aggressive patterns” (Forster, 2016). Stoltengerg also said that ““We don’t want a new cold war and we don’t want a new arms race and therefore, what NATO does is defensive and it is proportionate [.]… “At the same time, NATO has to react when we, over a long period of time, have seen a substantial military build-up by Russia and we have seen them modernise their military capabilities and most importantly, we have seen them willing to use military force against neighbours: Crimea, Ukraine — but also Georgia has also seen a threatening rhetoric from Russia.“We are concerned about Russia’s behaviour. But dialogue is even more important when tensions run high” (Craw, 2016).

Along with Stoltenberg’s comments, regional NATO state leaders have also expressed concerns at Russian moves in Kaliningrad. For example, “The Estonian foreign ministry on Friday summoned the Russian ambassador to Estonia to hand him a protest note” (Wintour, 2016). Poland also spoke out against the move, calling the action “irresponsible” (Reuters, 2016). Then, in late October, Antoni Macierewicz, the Polish defense minister, who quoted as saying that the Russian cruse missiles being moved to Kaliningrad Oblast “could change the balance of power” on the Baltic sea (Forster, 2016). 

Then, on November 22nd, 2016, “Nato has accused Russia of “aggressive military posturing” following reports that it has deployed anti-ship missiles in its westernmost Baltic region. Russia’s Interfax news agency said on Monday that Bastion missile-launchers had been sent to Kaliningrad. In a statement to the Associated Press, Nato said the move “does not help to lower tensions or restore predictability to our relations” (BBC, 2016). Some believe the Putin moved these missiles to Kaliningrad Oblast as a “bargaining chip” with US president-elect Donald Trump. According to  Royal United Services Institute’s Russia expert Dr Igor Sutyagin, ““What the Kremlin is doing now is displaying that they have stronger will than the will of the West. All these tricks with intimidation, deployments, is the way to exercise this will. It’s to prove that Russian will is stronger, there is no point to resist”” (Craw, 2016).

Europe and Kaliningrad

Following the end of the Cold War, the West (primarily the European Union) looked to improve their relationship with Russia, and with Kaliningrad. Some have even argued that “the impression could have been gained that the EU is more interested in Kaliningrad’s development than Russia is” (Cichocki, B., Pelczynska-Nalecz, B. & Will, 2001: 18).

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the region was established to be an area for free trade. For example, Kaliningrad Oblast went from a Soviet controlled economy, to a move towards the Free Economic Zone a few short years after the Cold War (in 1992), and then moved to the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the year 1996 (Horris, 2014).  Interestingly, the SEZ agreement gave Kaliningrad the ability to trade externally as long as taxes would still be overseen and collected by Moscow. As Moses (2004) notes, this special economic status (which was approved by Russia) “a wide range of goods are imported free of customs duties and value added taxes, and Western investors are granted duty-free and other special tax benefits for opening manufacturing operations.

The special economic zone status has induced some Western investors, such as BMW and KIA, to build automotive assembly plants in Kaliningrad, taking advantage of the duty-free import of their parts into Russia and the custom-free sales of their automobiles in the potentially lucrative Russian mainland market” (109) (the Russian government has however put quotas on the amount of agriculture that can be brought into Kaliningrad (Moses, 2004). This is seen as a political move to ensure support of the local agricultural production sector). However, in April of 2016, due to sanctions on Russia, the regional no longer received this status, which has greatly affected the economy of Kaliningrad (Gramer, 2016). It has been pointed out that “The end of the SEZ was a disaster foretold, expected to negatively impact “at least 785 local companies that currently employ 24 percent of the local workforce” in Kaliningrad, according to analysis by Sergey Sukhankin for the European Council on Foreign Relations the month before it lapsed” (Gramer, 2016).

So, since the Cold War, Kaliningrad Oblast’s economy has ben much less aligned with Russia mainland (and even the Russian economy). As Horris (2014) writes: “After the fall of the Soviet Union, the territorial separation of Kaliningrad from the Russian mainland caused economic losses associated with breaches of cooperative ties, border barriers, and customs. The immediate effect of this separation was a decline in production and industrial potential. One can see that with such economic fluctuation and instability, trade—and therefore international relations—will be affected accordingly” (27). Then, in recent years, Kaliningrad’s economy has fell greatly, with significant affects on overall production. Part of this had to do with the economic problems faced in mainland Russia in 1998 (Horris, 2014). Kaliningrad, being without significant resources or investment, looks externally for investment. Given the economic problems mentioned above, Kaliningrad tourism has been something that the government has tried to build up. The state focuses on tourism in Kaliningrad (with a great deal of tourists being Germans looking into their family ancestry) as a draw for its economy (Horris, 2014) (in fact, when describing Kaliningrad tourism and why one should go visit Kaliningrad, Raspopina of The Guardian writes that “Traces of Kaliningrad’s German heritage can be seen in the surviving Brandenburg Gate and the Fishing Village, a tourist attraction with recreated medieval-style buildings. The flea markets here are known to be the best in Russia – many collectors from all over the world come here in hope of finding relics from the second world war. The Amber museum is another popular attraction” (Raspopina, 2016).

So, given the economic difficulties for Kaliningrad Oblast, and the small (yet important) effect of tourism in Kaliningrad, the country has looked more and more to Europe as an aid for its economy. The country is still heavily reliant on Lithuania for electricity and Belarus. Thus, when Lithuania closes a major energy plant in 2005, this hurt Kaliningrad immensely (Horris, 2014). Along with Kaliningrad Oblast’s reliance on Lithuania, they are also dependent on investments from countries such as Poland, Germany and Sweden. Germany is the largest exporting state to Kaliningrad, and Polish goods are the second largest imports in the region (Moses, 2004). Furthermore, Poland is a key market for goods from Kaliningrad. For example, just a decade ago, roughly 30 percent of all of the exports from Kaliningrad went to Poland (Horris, 2014: 29). Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between Polish towns in the northeastern part of the country and Kaliningrad (Moses, 2004), although this changed after Poland entered the European Union and the Schengen zone (Palmowski, 2010).

Today, Kaliningrad still has a number of economic problems. Some of the challenges have to do with decisions made by Russia for the region. For example, as (Horris, 2014) writes: “The troubling economic status is due to the Russian government. This is not just because of its economic policies regarding the exclave, but also because of the governors whom the Russian government appoints. In 2001, the Russian Audit Chamber issued an indictment of Kaliningrad’s regional government, effectively declaring it bankrupt.93 Past governors of Kaliningrad allocated tax credits from the federal government to encourage expansion by local enterprises. These enterprises had partially repaid the credit into the regional fund, but that fund never repaid the federal government for the original credit; the regional fund just reallocated the payments, as new loans to other enterprises. The cumulative debt to the federal government for the original line of credit with interest was more than the budget of the regional government in 2002. Further adding to this bleak financial situation was an unpaid $30 million loan from the German Dresdner Bank, which was supposed to stimulate local entrepreneurs but instead ended up disappearing from the records completely” (30). Moreover, any duties collected were negated after Russia entered into agreements with the World Trade Organization. Countries trading used to trade with Russia through Kaliningrad, and any duties would thus serve as an economic benefit to the region (Horris, 2014).

What makes matters worse economically for Kaliningrad Oblast is its lack of independent status, at least when it comes to economic trade. The isolation for Kaliningrad (both in terms of economic, but also commercial) continues to be a problem (Moses, 2004). Plus, by not being a separate and independent entity from Russia, Kaliningrad Oblast cannot enjoy the advantages that EU membership could offer them with regards to tariff less trade; Moscow’s singular economic policy throughout the country (Horris, 2014) has not allowed Kaliningrad any specific and unique benefits of being located within EU member states. In addition, Kaliningrad is also rarely at the forefront of driving Russian policies, yet, are at the mercy of what Moscow negotiates or dictates economically. This has been particularly concerning for the country as it awaits for Moscow and Lithuania to agree on costs for natural gas. Russia is a key supplier of natural gas to Europe, but even if it wants to ship this gas to its own “exclave” of Kaliningrad, it would have to go through Lithuania. Lithuania knows this, and thus, leverages their location for better economic terms. But as the two sides disagree, each move could be even more damaging to the Kaliningrad Oblast region. For example, Lithuania has at times stressed alternate energy options, which in turn has led Russia to restrict supply, leaving Kaliningrad caught in the tension (Horris, 2014). Russia has tried to counter energy politics by the newer EU states by establishing a nuclear energy, and also a natural gas presence in Kaliningrad itself (Horris, 2014).

Interestingly, as mentioned above, Europe and Russia have also disagreed on matters such as movement of individuals. One of the problems that Russia faces with Kaliningrad is that since the area is cut off from mainland Russia, Russian citizens looking to travel to and from Kaliningrad Oblast to the other part of Russia would need to travel through an international country to do so (if traveling by land). In 2004, neighboring Lithuania and Poland joined the Schengen zone (which allows the EU to govern and removing borders between states in the agreement). So, the issue of whether Russians could travel freely to Kaliningrad was raised.  For Europe, Russians would need passports, something that Russia was not happy with.

While this was a point of contention, “[t]his debate lasted until late 2002, when a compromise was finally found, just in time for the EU enlargement summit in Copenhagen regarding the accession of Poland and Lithuania, among others. The solution was that rail travelers, when purchasing their tickets to and from Kaliningrad, would obtain a relatively cheap document called a “Facilitated Transit Document,” or FTD. This document adhered to the Schengen aquis, which pleased the EU. It was not labeled as a Schengen visa, and was cheap, which pleased Russia” (Horris, 2014: 34). The issue of going from Kaliningrad to Poland was an example of how the laws affected the free travel. For example, whereas travel from Kaliningrad to Poland could be done easily prior to Poland’s entrance into the Schengen zone, afterwards, going across the border required specific documentation (granted by the government) (to which there is a fee). Local trade on the border has also been affected. As Palmowski (2010) notes: “The introduction of visas between Poland and Russia…hindered and restricted local border trade, which for years was one of the measures mitigating social and economic problems of the cross-border regions. Border markets have lost their vigour and are dying”  (Palmowski, 2010: 77)).

However, “In August 2011, the European Commission proposed an amendment to the regulation that included the entire Kaliningrad area as an EU “border area,” as opposed to the prescribed border limit of 30-50 kilometers. Following that rule, there would have been a division within Kaliningrad that would permit the travelers within the limit to go to and from surrounding territories freely, whereas the Kaliningraders outside of the limit would have to apply for separate visas. Treating the entire exclave as a border area removed that problem” (Horris, 2014: 34).

Kaliningrad Oblast Today

There has been little direct discussion between Russia and the EU about the future of Kaliningrad, especially with the inclusion of former Soviet States such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the European Union (Vitunic, ND). But at that time, there was a belief by many that Kaliningrad was not the military threat that it was during the Cold War. Reductions in Russian troops and weapons aided this belief, as did the argument that what presence Russia did have there was defensive (Collins, 2001). In fact, as Lopata (2004) notes, the conversation on Kaliningrad following the Cold War was for the renovation of weapons from the area. Then, there were even hopes that Kaliningrad Oblast could be a “bridge” between Europe and Russia (Lopata, 2004).

However, this thought has changed in recent years, particularly as the West has viewed Russia’s behavior in Georgia, the Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria. Now, there are concerns that Russia will use Kaliningrad as a location for their nuclear weapons, and thus an area to intimidate Poland and other countries within Europe. In fact, there is an ongoing debate in the West on how countries in the region view Kaliningrad. For example, realist thinkers might view the Kaliningrad Oblast area as an important geo-political location for Russia, particularly with regards to their relationship with the West. So, for the West, there is little to invest in bringing Kaliningrad as an ally, and therefore, there is no need to invest in their economy. Going further, there are even some that believe that because Russia uses this area as a way to suggest strong military power (all the while threatening European states), that one possible outcome would be to find a way to revmoe Kaliningrad from Russia ((this has been called the ‘fourth Baltic republic’ idea)) (Sergunin, ND).

However, there are others within the liberalist camp that suggest the area is not able to serve the military benefits that Russia hopes. So, for those with this international relations theory, they advocate continued economic cooperation and interdependence with European Union countries. There have even been arguments that if Kaliningrad can be brought into the economic fold with Europe, that this could help set up conditions to make it easier to also improve economic ties with mainland Russia (Sergunin, ND). However, with recent developments as it pertains to NATO, Ukraine, Syria, and also the European Union, it might more rather unlikely to see this happening for the time being.

Today, while Europe recognizes that Kaliningrad Oblast is a part of Russia, they also unofficially treat the region as sovereign, and also view Kaliningrad as an entity that needs neighboring EU states Lithuania and Poland for trade. So, for Europe, it is essential for there to continue to be trade and movement between Kaliningrad and Europe. While Russia also benefits from such a relationship, there are of course concerns if anything changes with regards to Russia’s position on Kaliningrad (Horris, 2014: 33).

Crime in Kaliningrad

One of the primary concerns about Kaliningrad (that Russia and European neighbors alike share) is the issue of crime within the region. It is said that criminal organizations (such as mafia groups) are very active in the region, and authorities are either unable, or unwilling to sufficiently fight against these groups’ operations. The reason has to do with an unwillingness of Russia to put serious policing resources into the region. Because of this, political officials and police are more willing to take bribes and be involved in other corruption. It has been suggested that at times as many as 30 percent of all officers in Kaliningrad may be corrupt (Horris, 2014). This has cost Russia millions of dollars. To make matters worse, because criminal groups often have links to police or to corrupt Russian military members, they are able to carry out illegal activities without getting caught. It has gotten to the point that criminals seem as if the laws don’t apply to them, and go about their business without worry that authorities can do anything to them. Criminals have also been known to engage in human trafficking, in prostitution, and in stolen goods in Kaliningrad. Because of the crime in Kaliningrad, Russia, as well as neighboring and nearby states (Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, for example), have tried to assist Kaliningrad with going after criminals and criminal activity.

Conclusion

As we see, the politics of Kaliningrad, as the region relates to Russia, and to Europe, is quite complicated. What has made matters worse for Kaliningrad Oblast is that the Russian state has not provided this “exclave” with special privileges. Thus, in the attempt to control the country, it has limited the various possibilities that can exist for the region to flourish. Lopata (2004) explains how Russian interests affect Kaliningrad, saying that

“In solving the problem of preserving its sovereignty and assurances of connection with Kaliningrad, Moscow turned that Oblast into a geopolitical hostage — a territory that it received as the spoils of war in the process of cession whereby it is sought not only to maintain (the internal aspect) but also to force other countries or international institutions to carry out or abstain from carrying out any act as direct or indirect liberation of the hostage (the external aspect). Due to the specific situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast (the Potsdam train, geographical position, social-economic factors) it is the interior aspect that might be of more significance to Moscow, which is officially “covered” by the exterior one. Formally Moscow does not oppose, and even encourages that the Kaliningrad Oblast should be treated as a specific, unique region of Russia. However, in practice it does not allow this peculiarity to manifest itself. In this way it seeks to stimulate and maintain the Stockholm syndrome in the Oblast — the residents of Kaliningrad themselves must put up with the status of an ordinary Russian region” (203).

Kaliningrad References

Craw, V. (2016). Putin moves missiles to Kaliningrad in signal to US President-elect Trump. News.com.au. November 23rd, 2016. Available Online: http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/putin-moves-shortrange-missiles-to-kaliningrad-in-tactical-deployment/news-story/859f3b5cc55df9c682a4c6e33737e128

Barry, E. (2008). Russian Missile Plan Gives a New European Trade Hub an Old Identity Crisis. New York Times. November 27, 2008. Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/28/world/europe/28kaliningrad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1

BBC (2016). Kaliningrad: New Russian missile deployment angers NATO. November 22nd, 2016. Available Online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201

Collins, A. (2001). Kaliningrad and Baltic security. Calhoun: Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School. Thesis. Available Online: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/2695/01Jun_Collins.pdf?sequence=1

Craw, V. (2016). Kaliningrad: Russian ‘exclave’ in Europe central to military tensions. News.com.au. October 28, 2016. Available Online: http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/tensions-rise-surrounding-russian-exclave-of-kaliningrad-amid-build-up-of-military-forces-in-the-region/news-story/3e0409f20f1176cb68b9c55ca7f2ec7c

Forster, K. (2016). How a tiny pocket of Russian land next to Poland could soon become the most dangerous place in Europe. The Independent. October 28, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/russia-military-base-europe-putin-build-up-tensions-west-uk-kaliningrad-a7384571.html

Gramer, R. (2016). The Economy in Kaliningrad Is So Bad That One Mayor Put His Town Hall Up for Sale. The Cable. Foreign Policy. November 1, 2016. Available Online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/01/the-economy-in-kaliningrad-mayor-sanctions-russia-putin/

Horris, J. (2014). Townson Journal of International Affairs. Vol. XLVI, Number 1, pages 25-44.

Liuhto, K. (2005). Kaliningrad 2020. http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-tietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto_72005.pdf#page=58

Sergunin, A. (ND). Chapter 5: Kaliningrad: Changing Perceptions, pages 85-107. Available Online: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no15_ses/05_sergunin.pdf

Vitunic, B. (ND). Enclave To Exclave: Kaliningrad Between Russia And The European Union. Columbia University. Vol. 6, No. 1. Available Online: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/research/intermarium/vol6no1/enclave.pdf

Wintour, P. (2016). Russia moving nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad, says Estonia. The Guardian. October 7th, 2016. Available Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/07/russia-moving-nuclear-capable-missiles-into-kaliningrad-says-estonia