Conflict in Yemen

In this article, we shall discuss the Yemen civil war that is currently happening in the country. We shall discuss the origins of the conflict in Yemen, the main domestic actors that are involved in the war, as well as different international actors involved (either directly, or indirectly, in the Yemen war). Yemen, with a population of about 25 million people (CFR, 2015), is facing a dire war (that has now turned into an international war), and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Yemen, with a GDP of 1473.10 USD, is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East. In addition, little economic growth, water shortages, energy shortages, as well as the current humanitarian crisis are leading to serious trouble for the country. The fighting in the past year alone has led to the deaths of thousands of people. Yet, given the political realities on the ground, sadly, the possibility of peace (and an end to the conflict in Yemen) seems unlikely anytime soon. The conflict in Yemen has been called “the forgotten war” (Amnesty International, 2015) as little attention is paid to to the ongoing conflict and atrocities taking place in this Middle Eastern country. In fact, according to one report, 

“A YouGov poll seen exclusively by The Independent showed 49 per cent of people knew of the country’s ongoing civil war, which has killed more than 10,000 people, displaced three million more and left 14 million facing starvation. The figure was even lower for the 18 to 24 age group, where only 37 per cent were aware of the Yemen conflict as it enters its third year of bloodshed” (Dearden, 2017).

What is the Conflict in Yemen

The current conflict in Yemen is between a group of Shia Houthi rebels and the government under President Abdel Rabbo Mansour Hadi. In the summer of 2014, there were many anti-government protests, many of which included a number of Houthi rebels (Al Jazeera, 2015). Shortly after, conflict broke out between the Houthi rebels and the state. And, on September 18th, 2014, the rebels overtook the capital, Sanna. Then, “The UN brokers a peace deal according to which the Houthis agree to withdraw their fighters from cities they have seized once a new national unity government has been formed” (Al Jazeera, 2015). However, as we shall see, in the months that followed, the Houthi rebels not only did not leave, but they removed the Yemeni government from power, establishing their stronghold on  the government.

History of the Yemen Civil War

In order to understand the conflict in Yemen today, it is important to examine the history of Yemen, and how events in 1990 shaped the current conditions we currently see in the country. Prior to 1990, Yemen was divided into North and south Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who controlled North Yemen since the year 1978, was now the leader of both countries.

However, not everyone was in agreement with these new political developments. While Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to co-opt many in order to consolidate his political leadership in Yemen, there were many groups who contested his rule. For example, one such group is “Al-Hirak, a movement of southern Yemenis who felt marginalized under the post-unification government” (CFR, 2015). They rebelled against the national government of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 1994, and have continued to demand autonomy, and even independence (CFR, 2015).

Along with the Al-Hirak movement, another group, the Houthi movement, which is made up of Zaydi Shias in the northern part of the country, has attempted to rebel against the government multiple times (in fact, there were six rebellions from the time span of 2004-2010 alone) (CFR, 2015). However, it was in 2009 that international actors such as Saudi Arabia actually intervened in Yemen in order to back the government (Bouchek, 2010).

That is why it is important to note that the government (under Saleh, for example) have continued to try to establish their political control over all of Yemen, including Sanaa. It has never really been fully under their influence (Bouchek, 2010).

In 2011, with the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, among other countries, the protests also arose in Yemen. Despite initial attempts to quell the protesters (and political opposition), given the continued protests, and international attention on Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh did agree to give up his power, in exchange for political immunity from any prosecution of crimes committed against his people (CFR, 2015).

Following the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh, his vice president at the time, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, took the role of interim president, until elections were held in Yemen. This transition was fostered with significant action by the United States, as well as a United Nations backed “National Dialogue Conference” (NDC). These 565 delegates came together to work on a new Yemen constitution. However, given the various political differences among the delegates represented at the NDC, they were unable to come to an agreement on a new Yemeni constitution (CFR, 2015).

The beginnings of the Conflict in Yemen: 2014

While the conditions were ripe for many to challenge the current regime, what eventually led to a new civil war in Yemen by the Houthi movement were economic decisions made by al-Hadi in July of 2014. Namely, the International Monetary Fund at the time wanted al-Hadi to stop offering government subsidies on fuel. However, following his decision to adhere to IMF calls, “The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base for calling out faults in the transition process, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Sunni Islamist party Islah held counter rallies. Clashes broke out between them and the Houthis, who captured the capital by mid-September” (CFR, 2015).

As a result of this, the government in Yemen, and the international community was concerned that a new war could break out in the country. In attempts to stop this from happening, the United Nations established a peace agreement between the government and the Houthi rebels in the north. The Houthis, in exchange for leaving their areas of control in the capital, would be promised that a new technocratic government would be established in Yemen (CFR, 2015). However, the hope of a resolution to the civil war in Yemen was short-lived, as “…Houthi advances toward the end of 2014 exacerbated Yemen’s fractures: The Houthis clashed with forces loyal to Islah, as well as Sunni tribesmen that allied with AQAP. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for independence. Yemen’s armed forces split as well. Deposed President Saleh continues to command the loyalty of some elements of the armed forces. They allied with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success” (CFR, 2015).

Things became even more tense in January of 2015, when, after a disagreement on the new Yemen constitution, the Houthi rebels were able to further expand their control in Sanaa. In addition, they marginalized the existing leadership of Al-Hadi and his associates by placing them under house arrest (CFR, 2015). Then, following this move, “The next month, the Houthis issued their own constitutional declaration and established governing bodies, moves that provoked public backlash and international condemnation. The United States and several EU and Gulf countries closed their embassies. The UN Security Council called on the Houthis to withdraw from government and security institutions” (CFR, 2015).

As a result of these actions, Al-Hadi fled Yemen, into Saudi Arabia. Much of the international community continues to recognize Al-Hadi as the legitimate leadership of Yemen. However, with little control over the government, and being outside of the country, Al-Hadi has little in terms of decision-making control.

With regards to the conflict in Yemen, in March of 2015, the Houthi rebels in the North not only took on the government in Sanaa, but in March of 2015, the rebels not only further established control of the capital, but at this time, they were also moving further onto Aden (CFR, 2015). This is important for a number of reasons. Historically, Aden is a key port city for trade. Bouchek (2010) also notes that the governments of Yemen have viewed Aden as an importance city for hydrocarbons (even though he points out that these resources are quickly being used up).

As a response to these political and military developments by the Houthi rebels, countries such as Saudi Arabia (who are aligned with the government) became much more involved in the civil war in Yemen, carrying out military air campaigns against the Houthi rebel forces (CFR, 2015). But while Saudi Arabia has been able to “retake” Aden last Fall, the city is far from secure. In fact, some have argued that since the city (and country as a whole is rather contested), this will not only lead to further conflict in the foreseeable future, but these conditions, sadly, make it easier for radical groups like Al Qaeda to operate and grow (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2016).

The Actors in the Conflict in Yemen

There are many different actors fighting in Yemen.

The Houthi Movement: The Houthi movement is a group of primarily Zaydi Shia Muslims who are have historically been concentrated in Northern Yemen. In terms of religious differences in Yemen, while the majority of those in Yemen are Sunni Muslims, Zaydi Muslims make up anywhere from 35 to 40 percent of the total population in the country (Bouchek, 2010).

In terms of religious differences, while Zaydi Islam is often put together with Shia Islam, others suggest that they have more similarities with Sunni Islam than with Twelver Shia Islam (which is the official religion of the Islamic theocracy in Iran). For Zaydi Muslims, “the imam, must be a sayyid, or descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah” (Bouchek, 2010: 4).

Historically, the Zaydi Shias had control over much of Northern Yemen. In fact, as Bouchek (2010) notes, “A Shi’i Zaidi inmate governed Yemen for nearly a thousand years, until the revolution of 1962” (5). Afterwards, the Zaydi have felt that they have lost political influence and power, as well as cultural rights in Yemen. Scholars point out that following Abdullah Ali Saleh coming to power, their power and influence was reduced. It was following the unification of Yemen, and much more so in 2003, after Ali Abdullah Saleh supported the United States in their war in Iraq, that the Houthi movement began challenging the Saleh government. Initially, they had a significant following in Yemen, particularly as they continued to call out the human rights abuses (and corruption) of the Saleh regime. However, with their increased push for power, this support started to taper (CFR, 2015).

More specifically, “The Zaydis are a minority in the majority-Sunni Muslim country, but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border, and until 1962, Zaydi imams ruled much of the region. The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The Houthis repeatedly fought the Saleh regime—and, in 2009, an intervening Saudi force. In post-Saleh Yemen, the movement gained support from far beyond its northern base for its criticisms of the UN-backed transition. However, in its push to monopolize power, it has alienated one-time supporters, writes the International Crisis Group” (Laub, 2015).

It is also important to note that 

The Houthis, who prefer to be known as Ansar Allah, or Partisans of God, began as a faction within the youth offshoot of Al-Haq, a Zaydi political party formed in 1990 to contest the united Yemen’s first legislative elections, held in 1993. An Al-Haq member of parliament, Hussein Badr al-Deen al- Houthi, joined its youth wing, Al Shabbab al-Moumineen, or the Believing Youth, which focused on the revival of Zaydism, in the mid-1990s. Al-Houthi left parliament in 1997 and travelled abroad, to Iran and elsewhere, to expand his religious education. He returned to Yemen from Sudan, where he had been studying for a doctorate, shortly after the events of 9/11; the latter is said to have been a defining influence on the cleric’s world view, convincing him that the region would soon be embroiled in a series of wars with foreign powers (Salisbury, 2015).

The initial 2004 war was much more about Saleh’s international politics, particularly with regards to Iraq, as well as a lack of Zaydi rights within Yemen (Bouchek, 2010). However, over time, the later wars (in 2010, for example), were still about issues of marginalization, but they also expanded to more general criticisms of the Saleh political regime (Bouchek, 2010). Al-Houthi himself was killed in September of 2004 (according to reports, Saleh had ordered al-Houthi’s capture, but the cleric was killed in an act of vengeance by a soldier angered by the loss of close colleagues during the violence in Sa’dah” (Salisbury, 2015)).

Again, this movement developed into a stronger militia that looks to challenge the corrupt and authoritarian policies of Saleh (Salisbury, 2015).

The Hirak Movement (Southern Movement)

The Hirak (Southern) Movement is comprised of various groups in Southern Yemen who are looking to break away from the unified Yemen that existed in 1990 and afterwards. As Salisbury (2015) writes: “Hirak…was born of frustrations among former southern military and government officials who were forcibly retired after the country’s 1994 north–south civil war. Their initial demands were for reinstatement to positions held before the conflict, back pay and improved pensions. Saleh again attempted to put the movement down from 2007 onwards, arresting a number of Hirak leaders and banning protests, precipitating a backlash among southerners that has evolved into a leaderless pro-secession movement. However, his efforts to subdue the secessionists’cause had the opposite effect, catalysing the call for independence in the south.”

Al-Hadi’s Government: Despite the fact that al-Hadi is in exile, as mentioned above, he continues to be the recognized government of Yemen. He is now highly reliance on local supporters (who are still in Yemen), as well as the Saudi Arabian regime, who is his strongest ally in the Yemen civil war.

Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Civil War: Saudi Arabia has been one of the most active international actors in the conflict in Yemen. In fact, given the direct military role that Saudi Arabia has taken, the “civil” war that was in Yemen has now turned the conflict in Yemen into an international war.

Saudi Arabia has a long history of interest in the politics of Yemen. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia initially supported the Southern rebellion in 1994, but over time, improved relations with Saleh in Northern Yemen (Salisbury, 2015).

Overall,  Salisbury (2015) writes of Saudi Arabia’s position towards Yemen:

Saudi leaders have long advocated a policy of ‘containment and maintenance’ in the case of Yemen, where enough support is given to whichever regime is in power in Sana’a to prevent state collapse, but a certain level of state dysfunction is viewed as attractive. ‘Keep Yemen weak’, King Abdulaziz is reputed to have said on his deathbed, encapsulating long-standing fears that a strong Yemen could prove a major threat to domestic Saudi security. However, Riyadh is wary of the impact that state collapse in Yemen would have on the Kingdom, and Saudi policy-makers have long worried that an economic crisis in the Arabian Peninsula’s poorest and second most populous state could lead to an influx of Yemeni economic migrants. In April 2013 the Kingdom announced a crackdown on illegal labourers, as a result of which hundreds of thousands of Yemenis were expelled from the country. Riyadh is also in the process of building a 1,500-km fence that runs the length of the Saudi–Yemeni border, aimed at stemming the south–north flow of economic migrants, smugglers and militant Islamists.

As mentioned, the Saudi Arabian military is conducting airstrikes against Houthi strongholds in attempts to reduce their power and influence in the country. Again, their actions in Yemen are not limited to this more recent involvement; they decided to intervene in 2009, with what many viewed not as a “reactionary” intervention, but rather, a “preplanned” operation (Bouchek, 2010: 11).

Saudi Arabia has have also brought together a number of other allies that include countries such as “Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE. (That includes all the GCC states except for Oman, a potential mediator)” (CFR, 2015). However, despite the willingness of these countries to lend their name and support to supporting al-Hadi’s government, it is also important to note that few of them have offered any substantial economic or military aid to the alliance (CFR, 2015). In addition, given the Saudi rhetoric on Syria, some wonder whether they have the capabilities to sustain two international wars, particularly with little alliance support.

What is challenging for Saudi Arabia is that the airstrikes, while arguably holding the Houthi back, are not doing much in terms of increasing the chances of them being pushed out of power in Sanaa. Plus, with increased gains by Bashar Al-Assad in Syria (with the help of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah), as well as the new nuclear deal that has allowed Iran to revise their struggling economy (with the sale of oil, for example), Saudi Arabia is highly concerned that Iran will continue to increase their influence in the Middle East. However, Saudi Arabia risks overextension by getting involved in both of the conflicts.

It is also important to note that Saudi Arabia has another reason for their intervention in Yemen: they are concerned that an unstable Yemen will lead to greater influence of terrorist organizations. Bouchek (2010), writing in 2010, said: “The Saudis consider Yemen a major security challenge. Significant numbers of Saudi militants (including eleven Guantanamo returnees) have fled to Yemen since AQAP established itself there, and they pose a growing threat to the kingdom. In August 2009 one such Saudi national returned to the kingdom and tried to assassinate Saudi counterterrorism chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef” (11). Their security concern seems as real today as it was in 2009.

One other point worth mentioning is the role of religion in Saudi Arabia’s intervention into the conflict in Yemen. While some might want to suggest that that religion is a key factor in this conflict (with Saudi Arabia being primarily a Wahhabi Sunni country, and the Zaydis being a Shia group), this oversimplies the situation. In fact, while there might be some tension based on religious positions, historically, “Riyadh supported the Zaydi imamate, a religious monarchy, in its fight against Egyptian-backed Arab nationalist republicans and anti-establishment tribal forces in the 1960s, at a time when Islamist movements were widely seen as a counterweight to secular opposition groupings in the Gulf” Salisbury, 2015). And when there was an increase in Wahhabi clerics in Yemen, it could be argued that it was driven by political interests (Salisbury, 2015) more than religious positions.

Iran and the Yemen Civil War: Iran and Saudi Arabia are in what many call a “cold war” in the conflict in Yemen. While the two sides are not directly fighting one another militarily in the country, each country has a group in which they are backing. For Saudi Arabia, they are offering support to the now exiled government. For Iran, they are the key international supporters of the Houthi rebels, offering them significant economic aid (CFR, 2015). It is important to note that some suggest that the Iranian relationship with the Houthi movement is not as strong Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah, for example (CFR, 2015). But for Iran, and the Houthis, both have common interests: both want to get rid of the government, and minimize Saudi influence in the country (and for Iran, the region). Thus, Iran can use the Houthis to increase their own influence in the Middle East, and in the Gulf, an area traditionally dominated by Saudi politics.

It has been believed that at least some weapons destined for Yemen (and for the Houthi fighters) have originated from Iran, as “Weapon shipments intercepted in the Arabian sea by Australian, French and U.S. warships this year contained large quantities of Russian and Iranian weapons, some of which had markings similar to munitions recovered from Houthi fighters in Yemen” (Gibbons-Neff, 2016).

Later reports in 2017 noted that Iran was continuing its shipment of weapons, along with military advisors into Yemen to help the Houthi movement. Their role in this capacity seems to have picked up since early 2017 (Saul, Hafezi, & Georgy, 2017). According to reports in March of 2017, “Sources say Iran is using ships to deliver supplies to Yemen either directly or via Somalia, bypassing coalition efforts to intercept shipments. Western sources say once the ships arrive in the region, the cargoes are transferred to small fishing boats, which are hard to spot because they are so common in these waters. Favored areas are believed to include fishing coves around the port of Mukalla, even though that would require smuggled men or equipment to make a long risky journey to the main Houthi-controlled districts” (Saul, Hafezi, & Georgy, 2017).

Along with the support of the Houthi rebels from North Yemen, Salisbury (2015) also argues that “Yemeni and Western officials believe that Iran’s ties with anti-establishment groups in Yemen go beyond the Houthis, repeatedly claiming that Tehran has close ties with leading members of Al Hirak al-Janoubi, or the Southern Movement, a coalition of secessionist groups that want to split Yemen down pre-unification lines. Regional security officials have similarly worried about the impact that southern secession would have on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, and what increased Iranian influence in southern Yemen would mean for a stretch of water that is crucial to Gulf trade.”

However, members of the al-Hirak Movement have openly expressed their support of Saudi and the UAE as it pertains to the conflict in Yemen.

The United States and the Yemen Civil War: 

As Laub (2015) notes, historically, the United States has supported Saleh. For example, “Washington lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation became Washington’s overriding regional concern. The United States gave Yemen $1.2 billion in military and police aid between 2000, when the USS Cole bombing in the Yemeni port of Aden made al-Qaeda a U.S. priority, and 2011, according to the online database Security Assistance Monitor.”

Thus, the United States had been in a somewhat torn position with regards to the conflict in Yemen. Allied with Saudi Arabia on a host of issues, the United States does not want to upset their ally here. However, in their workings on establishing the Iranian nuclear deal, they were hesitant to seem overly interested or active in supporting the Saudis in Yemen, given Iran’s relationship with the Houthi rebels. However, their relationship with the Saudis is important to the U.S. government. Thus, though it is a reason that when the Saudi representative Adel al-Jubeir came to the US (in March of 2014) to speak about the dangers of Iran supporting the rebels in Yemen, the United States did relatively little to challenge the Saudi position As Mazzetti & Schmitt (2016) write:

Iran had moved into Saudi Arabia’s backyard, Mr. Jubeir told Mr. Obama’s senior advisers, and was aiding rebels in Yemen who had overrun the country’s capital and were trying to set up ballistic missile sites in range of Saudi cities. Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf neighbors were poised to begin a campaign in support of Yemen’s impotent government — an offensive Mr. Jubeir said could be relatively swift.

Two days of discussions in the West Wing followed, but there was little real debate. Among other reasons, the White House needed to placate the Saudis as the administration completed a nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s archenemy. That fact alone eclipsed concerns among many of the president’s advisers that the Saudi-led offensive would be long, bloody and indecisive.

Mr. Obama soon gave his approval for the Pentagon to support the impending military campaign.

Moreover, “The United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, albeit reluctantly, along with the United Kingdom and France. U.S. interests include maintaining stability in Yemen and security for Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb, the chokepoint between the Arabian and Red Seas through which 4.7 million barrels of oil per day transit; and a government in Sana’a that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs [PDF]. In the current conflict, Washington has provided the Saudi-led coalition with logistical and intelligence support. It is also the largest provider of arms to Saudi Arabia, and in November 2015 approved a $1.3 billion sale to restock depleted munitions. But while the United States continues to support coalition operations, U.S. officials have pressed the Saudis for restraint, warning that the intensity of the bombing campaign was undercutting shared political goals” (Laub, 2015).

However, by appeasing the Saudis, the United States has itself been criticized for the lack of peace in Yemen, and questioned on their willingness to support a regime that has been responsible for a large percentage of the civilian deaths (on account of Saudi airstrikes (which have killed many civilians)). For example, Senator Christopher S. Murphy (D CT) was quoted as saying: “As I read the conflict in Yemen, I have a hard time figuring out what the U.S. national security interests are[.]” He also said “the result of the coalition campaign has been to kill a lot of civilians, has been to sow the seeds of humanitarian crisis, and to create space for these groups–these very extremist groups that we claim to be our priority in the region–to grow” (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2016).

In fact, the Obama administration allowed sales of precision-guided missiles until December of 2016, following Saudi strikes on a funeral. However, 

It should be noted that “Human Rights Watch says it has documented 81 potentially unlawful strikes, and of those, 23 were found to have been carried out with U.S.-made bombs. They include a March 2016 strike on a market in the northwestern village of Mastaba that killed more than 100 people and the October attack on the funeral in Sana” (Zavis & Ahmed, 2017) (the Human Rights Watch link can be found here as well).

To others in the U.S. government, the government has said that backing Saudi Arabia in the conflict in Yemen is imperative given the security threat that they face. Earlier, Secretary of State John Kerry made such comments, saying that Saudi is facing a serious challenge given the developments in Yemen.

Some within the government believe that “that the Saudis overstated the extent of Iranian support for the Houthis, and that Iran had never seen its ties to the rebel group as more than a useful annoyance to the Saudis. But Mr. Obama’s aides believed that the Saudis saw a military campaign in Yemen as a tough message to Iran” (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2016).

The United States, seemingly more concerned about political developments in Syria, seems to be willing to allow the Saudis to act in Yemen, all the while saying that they are hoping for a political deal to resolve the conflict in Yemen. It must be noted however that the United States has continued to provided munitions and bombs to Saudi Arabia (the State Department had an “approval of $1.29 billion worth of precision bombs to Saudi Arabia”) (Mazzetti & Schmidtt, 2016).

However, in May of 2016, a report was published in which it stated that the United States has sent in troops in the country to help local actors fight Al Qaeda, and also to themselves carry out military strikes against the group. According to reports, “A “very small number” of American military personnel has been working from a “fixed location” with Yemeni and Arab coalition forces — especially the Emiratis — in recent weeks around Mukalla, a port city seized by AQAP a year ago” (Yahoo, 2016). 

Spokesman Navy Captain Jeff Davis was quoted as saying that “This is of great interest to us. It does not serve our interests to have a terrorist organization in charge of a port city, and so we are assisting in that” (Yahoo, 2016). In addition, reports also say that “the United States is also offering an array of assistance to partners in Yemen, including air-to-air refueling capabilities, surveillance, planning, maritime security and medical help” (Yahoo, 2016).

The United States military has been involved in multiple strikes against Al Qaeda.

Furthermore, the US has been more directly involved since the events in early October in which “US Navy ships had to fire defensive interceptor missiles after they were targeted by attacks launched from Houthi-controlled Yemen” (Business Insider, 2016).

More recently, the Trump administration reversed course on Obama’s halting of precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia; “President Trump announced a $110-billion package of proposed military sales to the kingdom” (Zavis & Ahmed, 2017).

ISIS and Al Qaeda in Yemen’s Civil War

All the while the conflict between the former government and the Houthi rebels has transpired, Al Qaeda and ISIS jihadist groups have attempted to themselves fight in the region. There has been less attention to these groups, since much of the conflict has been between the rebels and former government. This “[p]olitical chaos has created a vacuum for militant groups like ISIS to flourish and sieges have cut off rebel-held areas from desperately needed aid” (Almasmari & Dewan, 2016). Yemen has historically had a problem controlling the entire country from violent jihadist elements, and this war has led to not only more instability, but also less and less unified control, and in turn, a united resistance against such groups. 

The Humanitarian Costs of the Conflict in Yemen

Many have argued that Yemen is in a humanitarian crisis. It has been pointed out that from 2004-2010, 250,000 people were displaced (Bouchek, 2010). According to November 2015 figures from the United Nations, “at least 5,878 people had been killed and 27,867 others had been wounded since the escalation in March of the conflict between forces loyal to the exiled President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and those allied to the Houthi rebel movement” (BBC, 2015). In addition, it should also be noted that “Just under half of Yemen’s population is under 18 and at least 505 children are among those killed” (BBC, 2015). As of October, 2016, “UNICEF reports that 1.5 million children are currently malnourished in the country, 370,000 of them severely. On top of this, 178 schools have been attacked, according to data collected by the Yemen Post.” According to UNICEF Yemen Representative Meritxell Relano, “”The scale of suffering as a result of the ongoing conflict in Yemen is shocking. An estimated 21.2 million people, which constitutes nearly 80% of the total population, need humanitarian assistance. Almost half of those in need are children” (Almasmari & Dewan, 2016).

Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (2015) have reported on the war crimes in Yemen that have been committed by government, rebel, and Saudi Arabian actions. For example, the Saudi airstrikes have killed many civilians, and yet, sadly, they continue to go on unchecked. According to reports, part of the reason is that Saudi Arabia is flying the planes at higher altitudes, which are leading to more casualties. As Mazzetti & Schmitt (2016) note: “The first problem was the ability of Saudi pilots, who were inexperienced in flying missions over Yemen and fearful of enemy ground fire. As a result, they flew at high altitudes to avoid the threat below. But flying high also reduced the accuracy of their bombing and increased civilian casualties, American officials said.”

Along with these deaths, millions of Yemenis are facing horrible humanitarian conditions. It is estimated that 80 percent of those in Yemen need some sort of aid, with “21.2 million people begin deprived of life-sustaining commodities and basic services” (BBC, 2015). This compounded an already troubling set of conditions, given that “Before March [0f 2015], almost half of all Yemenis lived below the poverty line, two-thirds of youths were unemployed, and basic social services were on the verge of collapse. Almost 16 million people, or 61% of the population, are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance” (BBC, 2015).

The conditions in Yemen have led Peter Maurer, who is the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to say that “Yemen after five months looks like Syria after five years” (BBC, 2015). Yet, sadly, the killings have continued. It was reported in late August, 2016, that the earlier reports of casualties from the war was underestimated, and that over 10,000 people have been killed due to conflict in Yemen (Ghobari, 2016).

Furthermore, getting aid to those who need it in Yemen has been quite challenging. As Al Jazeera notes, “Across Yemen, aid organisations are facing major obstacles to helping Yemenis in need of food, medicine, and other essentials. The Houthi siege of parts of the city of Taiz has prevented critical medical supplies from arriving.” Furthermore, “Fighting in Aden has made it difficult for the World Food Programme to deliver aid there. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has pressured aid groups to leave rebel-controlled areas of Yemen, saying that aid workers are at risk. In January 2016, a hospital operated by Doctors Without Borders was hit by a rocket, killing four people. A bombing carried out by the Saudi-led coalition injured at least six people at a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in October 2015″ (Al Jazeera, 2016).

The United Nations and Saudi Arabia

The United Nations attempted to punish Saudi Arabia for their war crimes in Yemen, as Saudi Arabia, in the use of  their airstrikes, has killed civilians, many of them children. For example, “A previous U.N. report claimed that the Saudi-led coalition was responsible for 60% of the 1,953 children recorded as killed or maimed in the conflict in 2015. Those casualties have risen sixfold since the previous year” (Roth, 2016).

However, Saudi Arabia, and a number of Muslim state leaders put a great deal of pressure to be taken off a list created by the international organization. According to a United Nations official, “Saudi Arabia made a threat of a “total rupture” in relations between the Kingdom and the U.N., placing in doubt hundreds of millions of dollars in financial contributions to U.N. humanitarian agencies and causes. There were also suggestions clerics in Saudi Arabia could meet to issue an anti-U.N. fatwa, declaring the organization “anti-Muslim.” The pressure was “massive … beyond anything ever seen”” (Roth, 2016).

Sadly, this pressure seemed to work, as the United Nations agreed to take Saudi Arabia off the list, and “had agreed to a joint review with Saudi officials of the cases and numbers of casualties mentioned in the report” (Roth, 2016). This decision was condemned by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International who called it “pandering” to Saudi Arabia, and said that this decision “”undermines all of the U.N.’s work to protect children caught up in war”” (Roth, 2016). Richard Bennett, who is the Representative and Head of the organization’s United Nations Office was quoted as saying, “It is unprecedented for the UN to bow to pressure to alter its own published report on children in armed conflict. It is unconscionable that this pressure was brought to bear by one of the very states listed in the report” (Amnesty International, 2016).

Yemen Civil War Cease-Fire

On Monday, April 11th, a United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into place in Yemen. However, reports suggested that the cease-fire was not being adhered to throughout the country. While the cease in conflict was set up so that peace talks can begin (April 18th), a few parts of Yemen were continuing to experience conflict. The Houthi rebels have blamed Saudi Arabia for containing the conflict in the country (Irish Times, 2016).

In fact, the violence has continued between government forces and Houthi rebels. In early June of 2016, it was reported that Houthi rebels “have retaken ground from forces loyal to the internationally recognized government in two central provinces [Marib and Shabwa]” (Al-Haj, 2016). Saudi Arabia itself has continued with airstrikes in Yemen, which is only further showing the breakdown of any cease fire, and a continued conflict in Yemen.

Continued Violations in the Yemen Civil War

Despite appeals by members of the international community to halt conflict in Yemen, the civil war in the country has continued. Furthermore, despite attempts to stop Saudi Arabian human rights violations through their airstrikes, its military has maintained its bombing campaign in Yemen. For example, on August 8th, 2016, “A Saudi-led coalition air strike killed nine civilians outside the Yemeni capital Sanaa on Sunday night, residents said, as forces loyal to the exiled government stepped up an offensive in the area. The strike hit Odhar village in the Nehm area, which has been at the center of renewed fighting between supporters of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and Iran-allied Houthi forces” (Reuters, 2016).

There were hopes of the cease-fire lasting with regards to the conflict tin Yemen, but that ended quickly in August of 2016. Then, following this failed halt of fighting, Saudi Arabia was said to have amplified their attacks. They continue to carry out attacks, killing so many civilians throughout their bombing process. Despite pleas by human rights organizations to halt the fighting,  the Yemen war continued in September and October of 2016, and Saudi Arabia did not relent on its attacks. Yet, allied countries like the US continue to provide weapons and military support to this country. For example, 

“on September 21, a bill to halt $1.15 billion of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia died on the Senate floor. Arguing against the bill was Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who laid out the reasons to supply weapons to “our friends in Saudi Arabia” in the cool language of Realpolitik. “Saudi Arabia has shared intelligence with us,” he said. “They have allowed us to use their air bases in time of conflict. They are all in against I.S.I.L.”—another name for the Islamic State—“and they are great allies against the ambitions of the Iranians. When you add up the pluses and the minuses of the relationship with Saudi Arabia, in my view, it is not close. The pluses outweigh the minuses”” (Niarchos, 2016).

Then, on October 8th, 2016, it was reported that a Saudi airstrike in Yemen killed 82 people attending a funeral. According to reports, “The International Committee of the Red Cross said it had prepared 300 body bags. Hundreds of body parts were found inside and outside the hall after the strike. One rescuer, Murad Tawfiq, described the scene as a “lake of blood”, the Associated Press reports” (BBC, 2016).

Reports of Unpaid Fighters

It was also in September 2016 that the New York Times reported that government fighters were becoming increasingly frustrated with the amount of time that it took for them to get paid. Several Yemeni military leaders have expressed concern of growing anger among fighters, and that this has led to some leaving the military. The pro-government fighters are supposed to be paid by Saudi Arabia and their coalition allies. However, this has not been happening quickly enough for the fighters. In turn, it is reported that morale among forces loyal to Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour is low. While many of the fighters wanted to fight on behalf of their country, there were also among them many who joined as a way to make money. It is reported that “The coalition had promised each recruit a minimum of about $270 dollars a month–the prewar salary of a university professor with a masters degree. But once on the front lines, according to several officers, most of the young men found themselves penniless for months on end” (Al-Batati & Youssef, 2016). Now, it is also reported that this has not been the case for fighters under areas controlled by the Emirates, where they not only have been getting pains, but they are often much higher than what the Saudi government is paying. Furthermore, yearly sabbaticals are also offered. The situation facing the Yemeni troops who are not getting paid is quite different than what the Houthi fighters are experiencing, where many of the fighters are getting anywhere from 200 to 300 dollars each month, and the payments seem to be made on time (Al-Batati & Youssef, 2016).

The United Nations and Yemen Civil War Investigation

Given the continued destruction caused in the Yemen civil war, and the toll this has taken on civil society (with over 9,000 deaths through August, 2016, (along with continuing casualties), and millions more injured, malnourished or forced to flee), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein has called for an investigation on what has been transpiring in the Yemen civil war. Al-Hussein was quoted as saying that “Civilians in Yemen have suffered unbearably over the years from the effects of a number of simultaneous and overlapping armed conflicts. And they continue to suffer, absent any form of accountability and justice, while those responsible for the violations and abuses against them enjoy impunity. Such a manifestly, protractedly unjust situation must no longer be tolerated by the international community” (Vasilogambros, 2016). However, it should be noted that this call came before additional airstrikes by Saudi Arabia, which included the October 8th, 2016 strikes on a funeral in which 142 people were said to have been killed. 

All of this is concerning to the United States, who has continued to provide Saudi Arabia with weapons sales. Again, as noted, in 2015, the Obama administration approved 1.3 billion in weapons sales to the country, “despite warnings from some officials that the United States could be implicated in war crimes for supporting a Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen that has killed thousands of civilians, according to government documents and the accounts of current and former officials” (Strobel & Landay, 2016). In addition, the US government responsible for this may have a tough time defending itself, particularly with reports coming out stating that “State Department officials also were privately skeptical of the Saudi military’s ability to target Houthi militants without killing civilians and destroying “critical infrastructure” needed for Yemen to recover, according to the emails and other records obtained by Reuters and interviews with nearly a dozen officials with knowledge of those discussions” (Strobel & Landay, 2016). Attorneys on behalf of the United States government have been studying whether the US would also be responsible as a “co-belligerent” based on laws related to war. Had this been the case, “That finding would have obligated Washington to investigate allegations of war crimes in Yemen and would have raised a legal risk that U.S. military personnel could be subject to prosecution, at least in theory” (Strobel & Landay, 2016). 

Conflict In Yemen: Failed Peace Proposal

In late October, the United Nations submitted a proposal to Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, the President of Yemen, with the hopes of halting the conflict in Yemen. However, President Hadi rejected the peace proposal. While the details were not public, according to reports, “Informed sources say it calls for agreement on naming a new vice president after the rebels withdraw from the capital Sanaa and other cities and hand over heavy weapons to a third party. Hadi would then transfer power to the vice president, who would appoint a new prime minister to form a government in which the north and south of Yemen would have equal representation” (Middle East Eye, 2016). Hadi continues to operate out of Riyadh, as the rebel forces pushed him out of Sanaa in September, 2014 (Middle East Eye, 2016).

Then in November of 2016, a 48-hour cease fire went into affect in Yemen after the government in Yemen agreed to the US backed initiative. While the government did not like the terms of the cease-fire, they have continued to receive more and more outcry over bombings and other human rights violations in the country (AFP, 2016). As reports noted, “The government of exiled President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi has been deeply reluctant to accept UN proposals to form a unity administration with the rebels for fear of undermining his legitimacy. The coalition underlined that the ceasefire came at Hadi’s request. The president asked Saudi King Salman for the pause “in response to UN and international efforts to bring peace to Yemen” and allow aid deliveries, its statement said” (AFP, 2016).

New Houthi Government: November 2016

According to reports in late November, 2016, “[T]he so-called National Salvation Government, formed on Monday, will be headed by Abdul Aziz Habtoor, a politician who had defected from Hadi’s government and joined the Houthi coalition last year, according to the movement’s news agency Saba” (CNN, 2016).

As noted in the video above, the United Nations is upset with the move, since they believe that this will only make it that much more difficult to try to end the Yemen conflict (CNN, 2016).

War Crimes in Yemen

The Saudi Arabian government has continued carrying out war crimes in Yemen since March of 2015 (Mohamed & Shaif, 2016). As mentioned earlier, their actions towards civilians has been part of their ongoing military activities in the country. There are multiple reports on the mass devastation that Saudi Arabian bombs have caused civilians in Yemen. 

Thus, one of the pressing question remains as to whether Saudi Arabia will be implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the country. 

Another related question is regarding who else might also be implicated in war crimes. While Saudi Arabia itself has been conducting the bombing campaigns, they have received weapons from a number of allies including the United States, France, and Britain. For example, President Barack Obama, toward the latter end of his presidency stopped the sales of precision guided weapons to Saudi Arabia (Ryan & Gearan, 2017) (It should be noted however that “the U.S. military has provided support to the Saudi-led air campaign since 2015, including aerial refueling for Saudi jets and a U.S. advisory mission in the Saudi operations headquarters” (Ryan & Gearan, 2017). The United States under Obama increased their review of weapons support for the Saudi Arabian regime in October of 2016 following the bombing of a funeral hall in Yemen, which killed over 100 individuals (Ryan & Gearan, 2017). More specifically, “At the end of a review prompted by that strike, the Obama White House made the decision to halt the planned sale of roughly $390 million worth of precision munitions guidance systems to the kingdom” (Ryan & Gearan, 2017).

Shortly after coming to office, Donald Trump and the “The State Department has approved a resumption of weapons sales that critics have linked to Saudi Arabia’s bombing of civilians in Yemen, a potential sign of reinvigorated U.S. support for the kingdom’s involvement in its neighbor’s ongoing civil war” (Ryan & Gearan, 2017). It seems that this move not only shows Trump’s willingness to support Saudi interests in Yemen, but it is also a way to be more aggressive towards Iran and Iranian interests in the Middle East (Ryan & Gearan, 2017).

Again, the concern is whether United States military members could be prosecuted for aiding Saudi Arabia in their campaign in Yemen. (Borger, 2017). For example, as noted in a Guardian report in November of 2016 (Borger, 2017), “In a letter to secretary of state John Kerry and defence secretary Ash Carter, US congressman Ted Lieu, a former air force lawyer, said the administration’s insistence that it is not taking part in target selection for coalition sorties – many of which have hit hospitals and schools – does not excuse the US from legal responsibility.” He also said that “I find it deeply troubling that the U.S. apparently has no advanced knowledge of what targets will be struck by jets that are refueled by U.S. personnel with U.S. tankers…” (Lieu, 2017). At this time, roughly 1 in every three Saudi airstrikes were not targeting Houthi fighters, but rather, civilians (Salon, 2016). Again, the United States continues to offer substantial support to Saudi Arabia as they continue the fighting in Yemen.

Continued Human Rights Violations in Yemen

In December of 2017, following days of increased fighting in Sanaa, the United Nations stressed to the United States and other countries to try to convince Saudi Arabia to end a blockade to the country. This blockade limited the ability to bring in supplies to citizens in Yemen. Jamie McCormick, the United Nations coordinator in Yemen called matters on the ground “desperate” as 230 civilians were killed in this round of fighting alone (Lederer, 2017), along with so many more being without sufficient medical supplies and other basic needs.

Yemen Civil War References

AFP (2016). Yemen truce takes effect after week of US pressure. AFP in Yahoo News. November 19, 2016. Available Online: https://www.yahoo.com/news/arab-coalition-declares-48-hour-yemen-truce-saturday-033314096.html

Al-Batati, S. & Youssef, N. (2016). It’s Not the Bullets Forcing Yemeni Troops Off the Battlefield. It’s the Pay. The New York Times. September 13th, 2016.

Al-Haj, A. (2016). Yemen’s Shiite Rebels Retake Ground From Government Forces. ABC News. June 2nd, 2016. Available Online: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/yemens-shiite-rebels-retake-ground-government-forces-39552439

Al Jazeera (2016). Key facts about the war in Yemen. Al Jazeera. 1 August 2016. Available Online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html 

Almasmari, H. & Dewan, A. (2016). Yemen: The ‘forgotten war’ cloaked in the shadow of Syria. CNN. October 7, 2016. Available Online: http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/06/middleeast/yemen-conflict/

Amnesty International (2015). Yemen: ‘Nowhere Safe For Civilians’ Airstrikes And Ground Attacks in Yemen. 18 August, 2015. Available Online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/2291/2015/en/

Amnesty International (2015). Yemen: The forgotten war. September, 2015. Available Online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/

Amnesty International (2016). UN: Shameful pandering to Saudi Arabia over children killed in Yemen conflict. Amnesty International. 7 June 2016. Available Online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/un-shameful-pandering-to-saudi-arabia-over-children-killed-in-yemen-conflict/ 

BBC (2015). Yemen crisis: How bad is the humanitarian situation? BBC. 15 December 2015. Available Online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34011187

BBC (2016). Air strike ‘kills 82’ at Yemen funeral. BBC News. October 8, 2016. Available Online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37598413

Bouchek, C. (2010). War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Middle East Program. Number 110, April 2010. Pages 1-19.

Business Insider (2016). US: Iran is sending rebels in Yemen weapons to fire at the US Navy. Business Insider. October 27, 2016. Available Online: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-iran-sending-rebels-yemen-213342277.html 

Council on Foreign Relations (2015). Yemen in Crisis. July 8, 2015. Available Online: http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488

CNN (2016). Yemen’s Houthi’s form surprise government. CNN. November 29, 2016. Available Online: http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/29/middleeast/yemen-houthis-new-government/index.html

Ghobari, M. (2016). At Least 10,000 Kiled in Yemen Civil War. Huffington Post. 08/30/2016. Available Online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/at-least-10000-killed-in-yemen-civil-war_us_57c58703e4b0664f13ca63e4

Gibbons-Neff, T. (2016). How Iranian weapons are ending up in Yemen. The Washington Post. November 30, 2016. Available Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/30/how-iranian-weapons-are-ending-up-in-yemen/?utm_term=.2fa2cd47f0b4

Irish Times (2016). Yemeni truce marred by reports of air strikes and fighting. Irish Times, April 11th, 2016. Available Online: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/yemeni-truce-marred-by-reports-of-air-strikes-and-fighting-1.2606575 

Mazzetti, M. & Schmitt, E. (2016). Quiet Support for Saudis Entagles U.S. in Yemen. New York Times. March 13, 2016. Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/14/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-us.html?_r=0

Middle East Eye (2016). Yemen president rejects UN peace proposal. Middle East Eye. November 4, 2016. Available Online: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-president-rejects-un-peace-proposal-694912441

Niarchos, N. (2016). Yemen Faces Collapse as Civilians Flee Two Warring Factions in a Brutal Civil War. The Nation. October 7, 2016. Available Online: https://www.thenation.com/article/yemen-faces-collapse-as-civilians-flee-two-warring-factions-in-brutal-civil-war/

Reuters (2016). Saudi-led coalition air strike kills nine civilians in Yemen market: residents. August 8th, 2016. Available Online: https://www.yahoo.com/news/saudi-led-coalition-air-strike-kills-nine-civilians-105720685.html?nhp=1

Roth, R. (2016). Saudis exerted ‘massive’ pressure on U.N. to be removed from blacklist. CNN. June 9, 2016. Available Online: http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/09/middleeast/saudi-arabia-un-children/index.html 

Ryan, M. & Gearan, A. (2017). Trump administration looks to resume Saudi arms sale criticized as endangering civilians in Yemen. Washington Post. March 8, 2017. Available Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-looks-to-resume-saudi-arms-sale-criticized-as-endangering-civilians-in-yemen/2017/03/08/a259090a-040e-11e7-b1e9-a05d3c21f7cf_story.html?utm_term=.35ae4101b05f

Strobel, W. & Landay, J. (2016). Exclusive: As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about legal blowback. Reuters, in Yahoo News. October 10, 2016. Available Online: https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-saudis-bombed-yemen-u-worried-legal-blowback-051443330.html

Vasilogambros, M. (2016). Yemen’s Crisis. The Atlantic. August 25, 2016. Available Online: http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/humanitarian-crisis-yemen/497423/

Yahoo (2016). US sends troops to Yemen, steps up anti-Qaeda strikes. Yahoo News. May 6th, 2016. Available Online: https://www.yahoo.com/news/recent-us-strikes-yemen-killed-10-al-qaeda-162449540.html