The Russian Economy
In this article, we shall examine the Russian economy today, and the effects that the recession in Russia has had on citizens in the country. Given Russia’s increased involvement in military affairs–whether in the Ukraine or in the Syrian conflict, there exist questions of how Russia is able to afford these actions, particularly since the country has seen no economic growth in quite sometime. For example, “As 2014 drew to a close, the recession of Russia’s economy was already evident. Things have only gotten worse since then — with its GDP contracting by 3.7 percent and the value of the ruble falling about 127 percent in 2015” (Pant, 2016). In this article, we will look at the Russian economy today, and examine the conditions surrounding the fiscal health of the state, and also the international relations with other countries who have placed sanctions on Russia due to their foreign policies.
The Russian Economic Recession
Russia’s economy has been in a state of recession since 2015, as the economy has failed to grow for six straight quarters. As mentioned above, Russia’s GDP has dropped substantially, as has Russia’s currency, the ruble. The reason in large part has to do with slumping oil prices, along with sanctions placed on Russia do to its foreign policy activities in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. It has been argued that “The sanctions imposed on Moscow over its role in the crisis in Ukraine have severely curtailed investment into the country, and cut Russian firms off from European and American finance” (Kottasova, 2016a).
According to officials in Moscow, the Russian economy today is going along strongly, without any short or long term problems. To them, there is a great amount of growth and innovation in Russia. However, others are much more critical of the economy in Russia, and say that it is actually doing very poorly.
Some evidence of a weak Russian economy include a sluggish Russian automobile industry. Currently, the Russian automobile sector is heavily backed by the Russian government; “According to government data, Russia will spend 50 billion roubles on auto-sector support [in 2016]” (Devitt & Stolyarov, 2016). However, even with this, Russian new car sales were down 10.3 percent in 2016. Putin has argued for additional spending, increasing the 2016 number of 50 billion roubles to 64.1 billion in the 2017 year (Devitt & Stolyarov, 2016). The concern is that without the state support, the auto industry would decline anywhere from 30 to as high as 40 percent in 2016 (Devitt & Stolyarov, 2016).
Why is the Russian Economy in Decline?
As mentioned above, there are many reasons why Russia’s economy has suffered serious losses from 2014-2016. As Pant (2016) writes: “At present, Russia is beset by a variety of external and internal challenges. The country’s status as an energy producer, which previously helped it in economic growth, has now emerged as its major challenge. The Russian economy is heavily reliant on energy export with oil and gas comprising about half of the government’s revenue. Other raw materials, such as metals, also contribute to the country’s exports. Constantly falling energy and commodity prices throughout 2015 have resulted in significant revenue deficit for Russia. Since commodity prices are expected to remain low for some time, this is much more than a temporary setback. The greatest challenge has emerged in the form of a decline in private investment.”
Inflation in Russia
The Russian economy has been dealing with massive inflation since the beginning of the recession in 2015. Because of the devaluation of the ruble, there have been calls for new fiscal policies to address this rising concern. For example, as some have noted during 2016, “…the Central Bank of Russia has not ruled out a tightening of its monetary policy in future, should inflation risks amplify. The devaluation of the ruble has increased inflation and reduced real incomes. In 2015, the estimated number of Russians living below the subsistence poverty line was calculated to be 20 million — a sharp increase of 2 million since 2014. Countersanctions imposed by Russia meant that the prices of goods rose faster, leading to a further decrease in consumer demand. With inflation to continue in 2016, a further decline in real wages and real incomes is imminent” (Pant, 2016).
The Russian Economy and Oil Prices
One of Russia’s main drivers of the economy is its oil output. However, the rise of oil supply on the world market (despite attempts by OPEC to at least verbally call for the reduction in oil output) has has a major effect on Russia’s economy. OPEC states have been unable to commit to serious reductions in the world’s supply of oil, thus leading to extensive supply, and in turn smaller prices per gallon. Part of this has to do with regional rivalries between countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also, to an extent, Saudi Arabia and Russia.
Like so many other oil-reliant states, Russia’s economy and fiscal budget has been based off of certain economy expectations from the sale of oil. More specifically, “Russia’s 2016 budget was made in October last year on the assumption of $50 a barrel prices for oil” (Pant, 2016). However, for much of 2016, oil was well under 50 dollars a barrel, often hovering around 30-35 dollars a barrel, and then a bit of an uptick at 43 dollars in late summer and early fall (with Russia receiving only 37 percent of its income from oil) (Kottasova, 2016). However, all of this has left a significant shortage in the Russian economy, as state revenue is unable to cover all of the expected expenditures.
As Aleksashenko (2016) writes: “For a decade since 2004, revenues from the taxation of oil and gas production and exports were the major source of budgetary income, accounting for more than 50 percent. The tax system was structured such that in 2005–14, 85 percent of the increase in oil prices was going to the federal treasury (since 2015, this share has been reduced to 60 percent). On the one hand, that allowed the government to accumulate huge fiscal resources (the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund) and inflate expenditures (social entitlements and the military). But on the other hand, as oil prices went down, the federal budget suffered the most from the shrinking revenue base. The fall in oil prices is partly compensated for in the budget by the devaluation of the ruble (as oil revenues are planned in rubles), but the decline in demand for foreign exchange among households banned from foreign travel resulted in a stronger ruble than needed for full compensation in the budget.”
There are further concerns about Russia’s dependency on oil and energy, particularly with regards to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Russia has more traditionally been a major supplier of oil and natural gas for European countries. However, due to fears of an extensive over-dependence on Russia for energy imports into Europe, they have been looking elsewhere for new supply. One such market has been the United States. Thus, with the possibility of a new market for Europe, this would place severe strains on Russia’s economy, given the need for Russia to maintain their output and sales to Europe. Furthermore, “[t]here is also much hope linked with shale gas as it would reduce (at least temporarily) European dependence on hydrocarbon imports. Given the current confrontation between the West and Moscow, the strengthening of economic ties between the U.S. and the EU also has geopolitical implications for Russia. An economically energized Atlantic community with a shared free trade zone is far more likely to stand firm against Russian pressure” (Pant, 2016).
As I shall point out below, Europe’s concern with being overly tied to Russia’s energy has in part been raised in recent years, especially since Russia has been involved in supporting rebels in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, as well as their open support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Russian leaders themselves have admitted that in order to ensure long-term sustainability of the Russian economy, that they will have to find ways to shift their economy away from largely relying on oil and energy. For example, Dmitri Medvedev, the Prime Minister of Russia, echoed this feeling, noting that “The current situation on the global oil market shows how the modern structure of the economy is necessary [for] sustainable economic growth with an emphasis not on the market of raw materials”” (Pant, 2016).
Population Decline in Russia
Along with the sanctions, the decline in profits from energy due to higher supplies on the international market, there are also concerns that Russia’s declining population is going to pose additional problems for future economic growth in Russia. (Pant, 2016). Russia has a population of 143 million people, but trends do not suggest that there will be population growth. Russia was able to still enough enough labor due to migrants entering the country. But there are expectations that this might not continue since wages have declined (Pant, 2016). What this means is that Russia may have less and less people working who can pay taxes.There is also worry that with a population aging, there will be more demands on the state for social securities, and things such as a pension plan (Pant, 2016). As Aleksashenko, 2016) points out, “If in 2014 the ratio of taxpayers of working age (paying payroll taxes) to those of pension age (receiving pensions) was 2.5:1, according to a Rosstat forecast, it should reach 2:1 by 2030. This escalation of fiscal pressure emerged in 2015–16, as the economy stopped growing, as did wages (the basis for payroll taxes), while the government confiscated savings from the cumulative pension scheme for the third year in a row.” Plus, since Russians wages have fallen (Pant, 2016), there are concerns that this will affect living standards for years to come.
Russia’s Military Expenditures
Despite the economy recession in Russia, the government continues to advance their political objectives through military activities in eastern Ukraine and also in Syria. While the Ukraine and Syrian conflicts might be of political importance to Putin, they do cost money, money that Russia is not in a position to spend, given the challenges the state is facing fostering economy growth back home. Yet, despite these issues, Russia has put even more money into their military expenditures during the recession. For example, “According to IHS Jane’s Defense Budgets Annual Report, military spending in Russia rose by 21 percent in 2015. In spite of the budget cuts that have been announced for 2016, the spending on military continues to remain a significant proportion of government spending in Russia. (The country is in the midst of a military rearmament program that was launched in 2010 to modernize its military hardware by 2020). In this respect, the country’s involvement in Ukraine and Syria intensified the pressure on the economy” (Pant, 2016).
Economic Sanctions Against Russia
One of the more debated questions with regards to international relations and Russia’s economy is whether the sanctions levied by Western countries have had the intended effect on the Russian economy. Interestingly, as it has been pointed out, neither the US sanctions against Russia, nor the EU sanctions against Russia are done so in a way that is intended to bring down the entire Russian economy. Rather, “The Western sanctions regime is based on two premises: to build consensus among the Western countries around the goal of stopping Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and forcing Russia to negotiate a peaceful exit from war through imposing considerable costs on it for not complying with this goal; and to limit the cost of economic restrictions for the West” (Shevtsova, 2016).
While we see (from above) that there are a number of factors that have contributed to the Russian economic recession, sanctions have had at least some effect, particularly on Russia’s ability to borrow money. Part of the conditions of the sanctions have been that money cannot be loaned to Russian banks or companies. Not only did these companies in Russia have to pay loans that were due, but they could not borrow new money to do it. So, “the pressure of the scheduled repayment of foreign loans in late 2014 and early 2015 was enormously high—$73.3 billion in two quarters (about 10 percent of GDP)—becoming one of the dominant destabilizing factors in the fall of 2014. Banks and companies that wanted to repay their loans were seeking hard currency, while export proceeds were declining because of the fall in oil prices. The ruble devalued fast, some days losing up to 10 percent of its value. The situation was aggravated even more by some mistakes made by the Central Bank” (Aleksashenko, 2016).
However, according to reports, in 2015 the Central Bank has tried to find ways to minimize the effects of the sanctions on Russia. They have increased rates, and have made much more money available to companies in Russia, which then allows them to not look to international money for their debt. In 2014, the debt payments were much higher than the hit the Russian economy took from the lower oil prices. However, this was not the case in 2015 (Aleksashenko, 2016). So, much of whether the sanctions on Russia will continue to have an effect depend on a number of factors, such as whether the sanctions continue in the same way, whether companies are able to get access to money locally, and also what the price of oil will be in the near (and more distant future).
The sanctions on Russia have also been applied to the country’s oil. However, with regards to the oil, the sanctions have been very limited, only targeting shale and also shale exploration, but not other oil exploration. In addition, the oil projects Russia has are just developing, and thus, sanctions won’t impact these projects until they are further along, which took take many years. Another important point is that the sanctions were not levied on Russia’s natural gas industry (Aleksashenko, 2016). Europe is highly reliant on Russian natural gas, so they know that sanctioning natural gas will affect their imports and energy. It is for this reason that Europe has spoken about looking for alternate natural gas energy sources.
The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Russia
There has been a debate as to whether the economic sanctions on Russia are the right international relations approach, and whether they are working. For some, there was a belief that while sanctions could be used, weak sanctions could signal little seriousness of further action, and, if there are sanctions in place, but they are reduced (without complete compliance stopping actions in Ukraine) that this would just come off as weak; what would be needed would be more extensive sanctions (Shevtsova, 2016). Others have questioned the whole idea of sanctions, wondering if diplomacy with Putin could work (Shevtsova, 2016). However, given his continuation of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine, as well as Russian airstrikes in Syria, this position seems to be much less supported in western policy circles. And while Putin is continuing his aggressive foreign policy, we don’t know what the world would look like had the EU sanctions on Russia and the US sanctions on Russia not been put into place; for all we know, he could have stronger ties with the rebels, or could have even possibly extended further into the Ukraine (Shevtsova, 2016). The point is, we don’t know.
Despite the limitations of the economic sanctions on Russia, there is a belief that imposing these sanctions on Russia has been quite effective in putting pressure on Putin. While it has not altered Putin’s foreign policy in Syria and Ukraine, it has seemed that he is feeling the effects of the EU sanctions on Russia, and also the US sanctions on Russia. For example, “The Norwegian experts Susanne Oxenstierna and Per Olsson conclude: “The targeted economic sanctions of the EU and the US have contributed to imposing a cost on the Russian economy in combination with other factors, but have so far not persuaded Russia to change its behavior towards Ukraine.” The European Union Institute for Security Studies Task Force argues that the West has been rather successful: “The EU restrictive measure have played a role in limiting Russia’s territorial ambitions.” Stanislav Secrieru (with the Polish Institute of International Affairs), is even more optimistic: “Sanctions represent a fairly efficient and low cost tool to shelter Ukraine and dissuade Russia” (Shevtsova, 2016).
Again, it must be remembered that the West has been careful in how they have went about implementing sanctions on Russia. For Europe, for example, pushing too far may have Putin respond with cutting off energy to the EU, which would be quite troubling for these states. So, for the West, the intention again is not to stop Russia’ economy completely, but rather, to show Putin that if he continues his aggressive foreign policies in Ukraine and Syria, that in turn, the West can amp up the sanctions on the Russian economy (Shevtsova, 2016).
But there is belief that “Little by little, Western economic pressure, in combination with other factors (such as plunging oil prices, depreciation of the ruble, lack of investments, and capital flight), produced a growing, crippling impact on the Russian economy and consumption” “Shevtsova, 2016).
Putin himself admitted that US sanctions on Russia, and EU sanctions on Russia have affected the country. During a meeting at the “VTB Capital’s Russia Calling investment forum[,]” Putin said that “Sanctions are hurting us. We hear that they are not a problem really, but they are, particularly with technology transfers in oil and gas[.]” He added, “We are coping” (Rapoza, 2016). The sanctions have hurt get additional technology for this sector (Rapoza, 2016). Putin continued to speak out against the sanctions, viewing them as a way of critiquing his foreign policy. For example, “When asked how the Russian government would react to sanctions based on Russia’s military support of Assad, Putin was adamant. “Any economic sanctions based on political ideas would be damaging to relations. These sanctions are damaging enough for everyone. One shouldn’t press someone and blackmail someone politically with more sanctions. If we fall under this blackmail then Russia becomes an economic dependent of someone else’s foreign policies. We will not allow this to happen because we cannot survive that dependence” (Rapoza, 2016).
There have been some worries that Putin would return harder sanctions against Europe. The problem with Russia returning sanctions against Europe is that the Russian economy is heavily reliant on Europe for its energy and products. As Rapoza (2016) writes, “The E.U. is Russia’s most important trading partner. Weaker demand from Europe is bad for the Russian economy in many respects, not just on the oil and gas front.”
The Effect of the Russian Economy on Citizens
Citizens continued to be greatly effected by the downturn of Russia’s economy. In fact, many citizens have taken to the streets to protest economic conditions. This comes as a surprise to many since public protest agains the state is somewhat rare in Russia (Kottasova, 2016b).
The Russian government has attempted to put measures in place to help citizens as the economic woes continued. For example, in July of 2016, Russia raised the minimum wage by 20 percent (Kottasova, 2016a). However, wages for Russians continue to suffer. Plus, any conversation of freezing wages might help the economic budget for right now, but over time, this could lead to further frustrations amongst those not getting paid, or paid very well, particularly compared to inflation figures (which have been as high as 20 percent over a two year period (12.9 percent in 2016) (Aleksashenko, 2016). As a result of the economic downturn in Russia, the average monthly wage in Russia in September, 2016 was under 450 dollars, a 9.5 drop compared to the same time last year (Gusovsky, 2016). Plus, half of one’s income is said to be spent on food alone (Gusovsky, 2016). This frustration with the economy has even led some towards psychics, looking for ways to reverse their luck and fortune; “[s]ince the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s occult business has grown to an estimated $30bn a year” (Bennetts, 2014).
Future of the Russian Economy
Despite the Russian economic recession, it has been argued that some parts of Russia’s economy has actually fared better during this two year period. For example, one of the brighter spots of the Russian economy has been the growth of agriculture. For example, wheat producers have seen a rise in sales since international businesses are taking advantage of a weaker currency to buy wheat. As Pant (2016) notes: “According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) statistics, wheat exports from Russia are set to rise to 23.5 million metric tons, outpacing both the United States and Canada.” There are arguments that this could be a diversification strategy for Russia; the growth of organic foods could be an option the country could take (Pant, 2016). And while milk and beef production has been lower, pork and chicken has seen high levels of growth in 2015 (with poultry seeing an 8.6 percent growth rate, and pork seeing a 12.9 percent growth rate). Other things like “Production of butter, cheese and the Russian cottage-cheese-like staple known as tvorog has definitely benefited from Russian counter-sanctions” (Aleksashenko, 2016). However, counter sanctions levied by Russia have significantly hurt markets like the fish industry in the country (Aleksashenko, 2016).
Defense and Weapons
The Russian economy may also get help from the defense and weapons sector; According to “A report released by Moscow’s Higher School of Economics in late September showed that a rise in military and related defence expenditures, such as “the production of ships, airplanes, spacecraft and other means of transportation,” was one of the primary driving forces behind a surge in industrial production. But the report cautioned that these developments mask stagnation across most other areas of manufacturing” (Pant, 2016).
While this increase in the attention to the defense sector has been something in the works since 2011 (with plans to do this until 2020), “Those expenditures grew steadily in the budget, ousting investment and human-capital expenditures. This plan allowed the defense industry to expand, and in the coming years expenditures could not be cut, as many procurements were prefinanced and needed to be fulfilled. Though high inflation has eroded the real value of these expenditures, they will remain a heavy burden on the budget” (Aleksashenko, 2016). So, while there is some hope that the defense spending can help the economy, there are also serious risks to this plan, given the continued costs for the Russian economy in the years ahead.
Furthermore, right now, there is still a lot of reliance on other countries’ businesses such as Ukraine for certain sectors within defense spending. So, the “dependence and the sanctions have led to disruptions in the supply of military products in 2015, particularly in production for the Russian Navy. During the summer of 2015, Putin held a series of meetings analyzing the situation in the defense industry, after which it was decided to change the structure of arms procurement, resulting foremost in a reduction of deliveries for the navy” (Aleksashenko, 2016). Because of this, there many be calls for more internal production of parts.
Withstanding Economic Collapse
Furthermore, there are a few reasons as to why the Russian economy did not total collapse. As Aleksashenko (2016) argues, “First, the base of the Russian economy is the production and export of raw materials and commodities. Unlike 2008–09, there is no crisis in the global economy, and the main consumers of Russian raw materials (Europe, China and Middle East) continue to grow, albeit unevenly; there has been no reduction in demand for Russian raw materials this time, as opposed to six years ago.” Second of all, the increased spending on military projects has helped with some economic growth; “the production of military products in 2013–15 grew by 15–20 percent annually, and approximately the same growth should continue in 2016. The rapid growth of the military industry evidently benefited many industrial sectors and prevented the decline in industry as a whole.” Third of all, because of Russia’s floating exchange rate, it has been able to withstand some of the economic shocks. But this did come at a cost, which has been “the rise in inflation to 17 percent in spring 2015, a 10 percent decrease in the level of private consumption and 40 percent reduction in imports” (Aleksashenko, 2016). But, by being seen as aligned with the oil market, the increase in oil prices has also led to the rise in the ruble (Aleksashenko, 2016). Putin has also been careful not to increase the budget deficit by more than 3 percent of GDP; it seems that he understood the economic trouble in the late 1990s, and it attempting to avoid mistakes that happened then (Aleksashenko, 2016).
With pensions in trouble, wages not rising, and the need to cut budgets suggests that Russia’s economic troubles continue to be very real. These changes seem to be quite necessary given the Russian economic conditions outline above (Pant, 2016). However, experts also say that if the Russian economy will turns around, it will have to be based on a number of reforms, something that other think will be unlikely until Putin’s next election (Pant, 2016). As we can learn from other cases (such as the Greece debt crisis), it is not a politically popular move to be unable to pay for pension plans, or to raise retirement rates. The rise in oil prices could change all of this, but given the oil politics at OPEC, seeing a significant reversal anytime soon, and for sustained periods, but be unlikely. There are also suggestions that privatization can possibly help as well, although Putin seems to be critical of expanding the private sector’s involvement, thus unwilling to push for programs that would lead to more privatization (Aleksashenko, 2016).
Conclusion
Economists and others have tried to predict what the Russian economy will look like in 2018 and moving forward. There have been different arguments about whether Russia’s economy will recover, or whether it will deep further into recession and possibly depression.
Some, such as Pant argue that things may be looking up for Russia, at least when it comes to preventing a complete economic collapse. As Pant (2016) notes, “While many analysts have compared the current situation with the 1998 economic collapse in Russia, the present situation is different because unlike the late 1990s, its public debt is lower (less than 20 percent of the GDP). However; this is not to say that it is going to be a smooth sailing for Russia. The current slowdown is different from the past, when high oil prices more than compensated for Russia’s domestic downturn.”
However, there is a dire warning within this statement, which is: that “While the current situation holds no imminent threat, the coming three to four years are going to be crucial. It must be reiterated that the fundamental problem for the Russian economy is neither economic sanctions nor falling energy prices but the model of its economic development. A minimum annual growth of about 4 percent in GDP is needed annually for the next five to seven years. To attain this, the government will have to come up with an astute budgetary policy which does not depend on oil prices. Implementation of structural reforms, as the chief executive of Russia’s Sberbank German Gref has remarked, is thus very crucial” (Pant, 2016).
Part of the trouble is the quickly dwindling state resources. Russia has seen a drastic drop in the past couple of years. For example, in September of 2014, Russia had reserves totaling 91.7 billion dollars. However, two years later, the number has been reduced to 32.2 billion USD (Kottasova, 2016a). However, this number is expected to fall over half its current amount by 2017, and then become empty shortly after (Kottasova, 2016).
This budget is there for times when oil and gas cannot cover government expenditures (Kottasova, 2016). However, since oil prices have not looked to rise, there are concerns within Russia that will face serious problems in the upcoming years. They will have to cut their expenditures drastically in order to offset these new economic realities. The state said that they will look to the welfare fund (which, in mid September of 2016 was at 70 billion USD). The problem is that unlike the ‘rainy day’ fund, this money is earmarked only Russia’s pension plan, and also larger investment ventures (Kottasova, 2016).
There are a couple of options that the Russian government can employ to protect itself, and then is trying in order to build the economy. One option is to borrow money until they diversify the Russian economy, and/or the international oil prices rise to higher levels. While a number of countries have taken this approach, Russia is going to have trouble borrowing on account of the economic sanctions imposed on the country. Plus, they can’t look internally, since there are not sufficient domestic savings for the kind of borrowing needed for these many years that it will take to address the economic problems in the Russian economy (Aleksashenko, 2016).
As Kottasova (2016) notes, they have hundreds of billions in international funds if need be, although these reserves have fallen drastically (from 524 billion dollars in October of 2013 to 395 billion in September of 2016). They used the funds in a rather failed attempt to prop up the Russian currency, a plan they stopped using (Kottasova, 2016).
Furthermore, they have attempted to drop interest rates in the hopes of encouraging new economic projects. However, the rates, at 10 percent (Kottasova, 2016), are still quite high, and with other indicators, are not nearly enough to turn things around for the Russian economy.
Furthermore, given the drawing of various funds, there are questions about not only how the government will be able to protect the pension fund, replenish the reserves fund, but also whether they will have to cut social services such as the pension, especially if they have to use money from the pension fund.
It is for this reason, given the state of the economy in Russia, that have even had some saying that despite Putin’s approaches in foreign policy, he is not very ‘strong’ (CNBC, 2016). While the Russian government has been making various statements and promises about pension and the Russian economy in general (CNBC, 2016), it will take a lot to reverse the current economic conditions in the state.
Russian Economy References
Aleksashenko, S. (2016). Is Russia’s Economy Doomed to Collapse? The National Interest. July 1, 2016. Available Online: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-economy-doomed-collapse-16821
Bennetts, M. (2014). Sixth sense: why business is booming for Russia’s psychics. The Calvert Journal. 9 December 2014. Available Online: http://calvertjournal.com/articles/show/3439/why-business-is-booming-for-russias-psychics
CNBC (2016). Putin isn’t so ‘strong’ anymore when you look at Russia’s economy. CNBC. September 9, 2016. Available Online: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/vladimir-putin-strong-not-look-193213721.html
Devitt, P. & Stolyarov, G. (2016). Russia auto market would fall 30-40 percent in 2016 if no state support – Putin. Reuters, in Yahoo News. November 12th, 2016. Available Online: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/russia-auto-market-fall-30-150955075.html
Gusovsky, D. (2016). Putin is not ‘strong’ when it comes to Russia’s economy. CNBC. 9 September 2016. Available Online: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/09/vladimir-putin-is-not-strong-when-it-comes-to-russias-economy.html
Kottasova, I. (2016). Russia is seriously running out of cash. CNN. September 16, 2016. Available Online: http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/16/news/economy/russia-cash-reserves-depleted/
Kottasova, I. (2016). Russia’s economy has been in recession for 18 months. CNN. August 11, 2016. Available Online: http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/news/economy/russia-economy-recession-six-quarters/
Kottasova, I. (2016b). Russians are getting angry about the economy. CNN. January 26, 2016. Available Online: http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/26/news/russia-protests-economy/?iid=EL
Pant, H. (2016). Russia’s Economy in 2016. The Diplomat. May 11, 2016. Available Online: http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/russias-economy-in-2016/
Rapoza, K. (2016). Putin Admits Sanctions Sapping Russia. Forbes. October 21, 2016. Available Online: http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/10/21/putin-admits-sanctions-sapping-russia/2/#73e36f5c429f
Shevtsova, L. (2016). The Sanctions on Russia: How Hard Do They Bite? The American Interest. April 4, 2016. Available Online: http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/04/the-sanctions-on-russia-how-hard-do-they-bite/
